Abstract

This work concedes that from the time of independence to date, Africa has been dogged by a predicament of reliance on foreign intervention and tutelage and Africa’s quest to be a sovereign continent. Hence, this work states that Western influence has played a crucial role in stymying concepts that suggest African solutions to African problems, although African leaderships have failed to arrest all manners of decline in Africa. Using Frantz Fanon’s reading of the post-colonial mindset as a tool for analysis, this work seeks to provide an understanding of the aforementioned predicament. However, it does not offer absolute solutions to foreign interventions in Africa; but merely attempts to point where limitations might lie so that appropriate solutions can be searched via a qualitative approach based on primary and secondary data to fortify its arguments.

Keywords: Frantz Fanon; African solutions to African problems; colonialism; foreign intervention; African leadership.
Introduction

The ‘Pitfalls of National Consciousness’ in chapter three of The Wretched of the Earth (1961), serves to analyse how Africa has contributed towards enduring problems and the continued dependency on foreign actors. It is ironic that in as much as psychiatrist, writer, philosopher, and anti-colonialist fighter, Franz Fanon (1925-1961), from the Caribbean island of Martinique is not of African nativity, his insights seem to accurately foretell the realities of post-colonial Africa. His influence has also had a profound impact on post-colonial thinkers both within and outside Africa. And in short, Fanon was the pre-eminent thinker of the 20th century on the issue of decolonisation and the psychopathology of colonisation, and his works have inspired anti-colonial liberation movements for over half a century. The author of the classic The Wretched of the Earth (1961), his analysis of the psychology of the colonized and their path to liberation outlines a singular insight into the rage and frustration of colonized peoples, and the role of violence in effecting historical change, and thus, the book also examines the twin perils of post-independence colonial politics: and the disenfranchisement of the masses by the elites and inter-ethnic and inter-faith animosities (the book has been translated into over twenty-five languages).

Hence, this exercise points to a continued dependency on external forces to solve Africa’s problems and the long-held racial and social stereotypes that African people cannot solve their problems without external instruction and supervision. Also, a further look is presented involving other writings of Fanon to show that Fanonian (a perspective focused on or related to the work and writings of Frantz Fanon, a French-Algerian political philosopher born in Martinique) post-colonial readings help in understanding the African predicament.

In order to explore the African predicament and further try to understand the possible root cause of this predicament, this presentation will start by introducing an overview of the African predicament to solve its problems. The second section will further elaborate the African predicament under the heading ‘stumbling block to the development of African led economic and security mechanisms’. This heading will further be divided into three subsections namely 1) the complications of Africa’s economic growth, 2) the problem of security and conflict in Africa and 3) the complexity of Africa’s role in solving African problem. After having outlined this predicament the exploration deploys the Fanonian psychoanalysis in order to try and understand the root upon which this predicament has originated. Finally, by way of caution, this exercise does not pretend to have absolute solutions or recommendations for Africa’s continued dependency on foreign intervention. It merely states where the source of this dependency could be, and thus, the responsibility to design workable solutions and recommendations lies beyond the scope of this exercise.
The African Predicament

With its history of colonialism, imperialism and foreign domination, Africa, understandably, looks askance at any continued foreign intervention in trying to solve the perennial problems that continue to haunt the continent. In 1967, Ali Mazrui authored *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition*, a book that talks about the change in African political outlook prior to and after independence. During anti-colonial agitation, African people were more inclined towards gaining “self-governance” (Mazrui 1967:ix) but after colonialism the quest for self-governance was transformed into "the African's ambition to be his own policeman" (Mazrui 1967:x). The quest for Africa to initiate African solutions to African problems stems from the realization that political independence would be hollow if Africa still depended on outside forces to chart or “police” the continent’s destiny.

The ensuing study rues the fact that after more than fifty years of political independence, foreign intervention in Africa remains unabated. This condition is sustained by the way in which African leadership has not realized the promise of the fight against colonialism and imperialism on the one hand; on the other hand, erstwhile colonial powers are, to a large extent, encumbered with the moral guilt of colonialism and hence shoulder the responsibility of alleviating Africa’s woes. However, outside intervention, especially from the West, has endured relentless attacks because African people are leery of both the motives and efficiency of foreign intervention. The change from the Organization of African Unity’s principle of non-intervention to the African Union’s principle of non-indifference (Williams 2007) breathed new life into the maxim “African solutions to African problems.”

The call for Africa to be the principal player in solving Africa’s problems has become more strident, especially after the application of Western-oriented practice of neoliberalism and democratic ideals have not brought the development they promised. However, it is noteworthy that the overriding role that external players, especially Western powers, have played has been supported by Western economic strength, a feat which still eludes most of Africa. Furthermore, economic strength in the international system has often been proportionate to political influence; this makes all the more understandable why Africa has historically been a recipient of not only economic aid but political and military advice, whether welcome or otherwise.

The role that Western powers play in Africa has also been discernible in institutions that are largely of Western origin like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The role that these institutions have played in determining Africa’s economic trajectory is manifestly obvious. However, the efficiency of the policies prescribed by these institutions has been criticized because of its lack of adherence to Africa’s specific context and priorities (Glennie 2008). Certain African leaders have claimed that Western powers and institutions have compounded African poverty because of their imperious behavior in forcefully prescribing Western political and economic paradigms.
According to Thabo Mbeki “the further reproduction of wealth in the countries of the North has led to the creation of poverty in the countries of the South” (Mbeki 1998). Certain sectors of the developing world have been ambivalent about the World Bank in particular because of “its Western dominated structure” which seemingly promotes “the interests of Western countries and companies… [while showing]… insufficient understanding of local needs in the Global South” (Baker 2011:67).

Foreign intervention in Africa’s security problems is redolent of Western economic purposes. In addition to institutions like the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU), individual outside powers such as France, USA and Britain have played a significant role in trying to manage Africa’s problems but the success or lack of it of their efforts is debatable. The persistence of many African conflicts despite the interventions of these powers is proof enough to some observers that foreign intervention in Africa, especially when it pays cursory attention to Africa’s input, is incapable of engendering lasting peace (Zartman 2000:3). It is this realization that has breathed new life in the search for African-bred and inspired solutions to the continent’s problems. Jean Ping, the former chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, asserted that “the solutions to African problems are found on the continent and nowhere else” (Voice of Africa 2012; see also William 2008). Arguably, “the formation of the African Union (AU) was precisely aimed at finding African solutions for African problems” (Apuuli 2012) and reviving Pan-Africanism (Murithi 2009).

Regrettably, to date it seems the promise of finding African solutions to African problems seems to be beyond the reach of the continent. There is a paucity of evidence showing that Africa has worked in concerted effort to initiate and implement African answers to its challenges. The contribution that Africa seems to make in terms of economic, political and military welfare in Africa has largely been confined to implementing what non-African players have deemed necessary for the continent. Right from the time of independence, Africa’s economic ideologies have largely been inspired by outside forces (Manning 1987); much of Africa south of the Sahara was enamoured of Soviet socialism because of its lack of a clear-cut colonial legacy but in the twilight years of the Soviet Union and the onset of structural adjustment programmes, coupled with Africa’s continued economic malaise, prescriptions from Western Europe and North America were again taken up by much of Africa. This is in stark contrasts to the ideal of having African solutions to Africa’s particular problems.

In “Who owns African ownership?”, Franke and Romain (2014) amid an improvement in African influence in driving mechanism for peace, continued reliance on foreign support and capital to implement these mechanism undermine Africa’s primacy. This is another hurdle that confronts Africa, especially after the much-vaunted shift from the OAU to the AU (Williams 2011:15). The foregoing seems to be in concord with the assertion that “the precise meaning of the concept of ‘African-led Solutions’ to African problems in general is still debatable. More so, its practical application has been at best elusive” (Komey, Osman, and Melakedingel 2013:1). The fact that Africa has played a negligible role in trying to solve its problems is reminiscent of colonial dependency and defeats the pursuit of pan-Africanism.

Thus, fears of neo-colonialism are palpable in a continent that is so dependent on erstwhile colonial powers. Pan-Africanism has also been threatened by Africa’s colonial history which was executed by different European powers who continue to play roles in Africa that have potential to divide the continent along colonial legacies.

Stumbling Blocks: The Development of African Economic and Security Mechanisms

Solutions for Africa’s Economic Growth

The interventions of foreign powers to solve Africa’s problems could be attributed to a range of reasons. What probably estimates to be the most altruistic reason is the seeming conviction by foreign actors that Africa is incapable of single-handedly solving its problems. Lack of economic vibrancy and political stability in Africa justify foreign intervention to a degree. This circumstance has thus compelled those who would consider themselves as Africa’s messiahs to recommend that Africa adopts their worldviews. Aid has always been put at the disposal of Africa, though the motives and efficiency of aid have been subjected to robust debate. Some have argued that aid has often been used as a tactful bait through which the loyalty of poor countries is bought by those who dispense aid (Lancaster 1999). Maren (1997:11) argues that aid is “a self-serving system” that bolsters those who proffer it. To their defense, those who argue along these lines cite countries like Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, “hav[ing] slid into virtual anarchy” despite numbering among the biggest beneficiaries of aid (Maren 1997:11). This suggests that coupled with perpetrating a pathological dependency on donor countries, donor recipients are actually worse off with aid. The Trouble with Aid: Why Less Could Mean More for Africa by Jonathan Glennie (2008) delves into giving reasons why less aid could actually give Africa more dividends than has been the case hitherto.¹

Furthermore, aid comes with political and economic conditions that eligible countries have to satisfy to get it (Nichols 2011:204-205). African countries adhered to prescriptions like economic liberalization which “will have lasting consequences for decades to come” (Glennie 2008:37). The unsettling fact is that Africa embraced neo-liberal recommendations not, arguably, out of belief in its efficacy, but desperation to benefit from Western aid. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank came up with the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as solutions to the problems faced by Third World countries. Africa was an obvious recipient of these adjustments. It has to be understood that SAPs were the creation of powers and institutions that are neo-liberal in their economic outlook. This was an inevitable point of dissonance with African counties that for decades had followed an economic practice that was akin to socialism as stated above.

The main argument in support of SAPs was that African countries had not reached an economic level whereby they can create welfare states. If one observes the poor state of African economies, this argument seems valid. To Western actors, therefore, SAPs were an undoubted panacea to Africa.

Nevertheless, the implementation of SAPs did little if anything to improve Africa’s economic status. The main emphasis of SAPs was economic liberalization, freeing the market from close state control in favour of a free market system. This was in itself controversial and did not promise any long term plans to make sure that should Africa surmount immediate problems, its triumph will be permanent. Dani Rodrik (1990:933) argued “that structural adjustment programs should strive for sustainability, rather than the economic liberalization that they presently stress.” The notorious legacy that SAPs provoked was so bad “that the World Bank and the IMF have replaced them with Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers” (Baker 2011:62; see also Craig and Porter 2003) while retaining a number of recommendations that were part of SAPs.

John Williamson, an English economist, coined the name Washington Consensus to describe the ten recommendations that the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S Treasury came up with comprising SAPs. The provenance and location of institutions that came up with SAPs was itself controversial. It gives the impression that Africa’s economic and political fate was being mapped by powers that have appropriated to themselves the responsibility for deciding what was good for Africa, without any meaningful involvement of African people. This was the same attitude that informed colonialism in Africa. The intent by the Washington Consensus to change the very substance of African economic behavior is obvious in the SAPs.

A number of African countries impetuously privatized their economies. The haphazard manner with which privatization was conducted created a gap through which Western-based institutions and certain African people with the wherewithal bought what had been hitherto state-owned institutions. Wherein states could have claimed that the control of the economy was mostly tailored towards improving African fortunes, the interest of non-state actors predictably lay elsewhere: the accumulation of profit, irrespective of the state of the countries in which they operated (Goodwin 2005). The economic gap between the poor and the rich in the wake of privatization grew to major dimensions. Ordinary citizens who had enjoyed state sponsorship could no longer access their limited privileges while those who had stepped in to run privatized institutions became even more affluent. The seeming failure of SAPs was almost immediately recognized with some countries reverting to state-control. Kaunda’s government in Zambia “experimented with adjustment policies in the period 1985-87, ending in a very public break between the Kaunda government and the international finance institutions (IFIs) and the restoration of the control regime” (White 1997). The privatization programme by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) that succeeded the Kaunda government did little to reduce poverty. Instead, allegations were rife that privatization only benefited certain politically connected individuals. Accusations of corruption were legion and they dogged Frederick Chiluba, the first president of the MMD and Kaunda’s successor, right up to his death seven years after leaving the presidency.
That African economies were no longer under the control of the state had far-reaching consequences for governance. First of all indigenous African people who owned economic institutions still suffered limitations in terms of training, expertise and constant flow of capital. Secondly, Multinational Corporations stepped in to run sectors like mining and agriculture that were the mainstay of many African countries. As said above, economic power often dovetails with political clout. The inevitable conclusion from this is that African economies were mainly run by non-state, sometimes foreign, institutions, and that African politics were increasingly influenced by these dynamics. Governments were thus confined to the fringes of economic control and their hold on power was also at the mercy of economic controllers. The fact the MNCs that came immediately after the wave of privatization were of Western origin means they enjoyed economic stability and support from their countries (Tarzi 2000). Economically weak African countries could scarcely check the influence of these institutions in Africa without incurring dire consequences. Azlish J. Chandler and Bruce Mazlish described MNCs as “Leviathans” denoting the power that MNCs wield in an increasingly globalized world. Furthermore, Brian Roach argues that modern MNCs are “economic, political, environmental and cultural force[s]” that are an inevitable reality of a globalized world. The sway that MNCs hold on billions of lives cannot thus be downplayed. MNCs have contributed to job creation (Asiedu and Gyimah-Brempong 2008) but in Africa this achievement has been limited by the fact that MNCs are loath to employ indigenous African people in more lucrative positions. Furthermore, and this has been a growing concern especially with the increase of Chinese enterprises in Africa, MNCs usually bring experts from their counties. This situation has stifled the development and nurturance of African skills.

The Problem of Security and Conflict in Africa

Apart from economic challenges, security and conflict form the most formidable problems in Africa. On this score as well, Western actors have been more influential in determining how African conflict and security challenges should be tackled. African influence in fortifying security, ending conflict and exploring prospects for peace have generally been neglected. Eurocentric mechanisms for peacebuilding and conflict resolutions have enjoyed unrivalled dominance (Jeng 2012). Even cynical observers cannot discount the role that Western actors have played in quelling certain African conflicts. However, it is at the level of institutionalizing enduring peace that foreign mechanisms fall short (Ayittey 1994).

The conflict resolution mechanisms that have been predominantly employed to address conflicts in Africa have been geared towards propping up the state-system that has increasingly failed its citizens (Boege 2011). Many states in Africa have poor legitimacy and low popularity among their citizenry because of state failure and political repression.
While African failure to provide political and public goods has engendered despondency, it has also provoked disenchantment in certain quarters, resulting in the proliferation of rebel groups intending to topple state governments. What further destabilizes African governments is that rebel groups that have no real prospect of taking over power are satisfied with accumulating what gains they can get from the climate of instability.

The conflict in Somali has often been cited as an illustration of how Western interventions have been met with insurmountable problems. “Fiasco” is the apt word to describe what happened in Somalia when the United States under the directorship and aegis of the United Nations intervened in Somali. The futility of the exercise forced the US to withdraw its troops. Furthermore, the US intervened to help Mohamed Siad Barre consolidate his power on condition that he withdrew Somali from Soviet influence. When that was achieved Barre got millions of US dollars in credit to buy military equipment. This intervention did little to found a functioning country and in 1990 Barre was ousted from power by the two pronged assault of the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). However, after Barre was toppled, the USC and SNM rose against each other and effectively severed Somali in two: USC was in charge of the south of Somali while SNM ruled the north. US intervention was not appreciated by ordinary Somalis who considered it a disruption to their internal problems and a presage of foreign occupations (Ayittey 1994).

The salutary lesson from the Somali debacle was that overlooking African input and letting global power tussles (e.g. US-USSR competition) to chart the course of conflict resolution and political correction in Africa does not offer much promise. While the interventions of external actors have been useful in containing conflicts, they fail to garner local support or encourage local ownership – that ensures sustainability – due to the nature of the interventions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s 2011 intervention in the oil-rich Libya that eventually led to regime change instead of only enforcing a no-fly zone as mandated by UNSC resolution 1973 is considered as a case where non-African interveners undermined the sovereignty of African states. Though Africa was pusillanimous in confronting the Gaddafi regime with respect to its indefensible brutality, it does not augur well for the African Union that the intervention to remove Gaddafi from power was primarily led by NATO (Apuuli 2012). Having ousted Gaddafi, peace has eluded Libya and the power vacuum has led to unrests in the region.

The foregoing cases show that the demise of colonialism and the Cold War did not guarantee African self-determination. Intra-state conflicts in post-Cold War Africa continue to provide grounds for persistent foreign involvements. While the moral merits of foreign intervention could be debated, African people are quick to associate any foreign intervention, especially when it brooks no African insights, with colonialism (Ayittey 1994).

The resources with which Africa is endowed have also played a part in Africa’s skepticism towards foreign intervention. Historically, Western powers have largely relied on African resources for to develop and sustain their economies. This interest has often led to influencing local politics in support of leaderships that could provide unchecked access to African resources.
French intervention in erstwhile French colonies has been cited as a case in point. Renou (1999) argues that France has committed itself to all manner of agreements and pacts with many African countries but that its policies in Africa are more driven towards accessing African resources which would improve France’s economy and posture in the international system. French intervention in West Africa especially has been criticized as propping up regimes that support its incursions into Africa, irrespective of how these regimes treat ordinary African people. This trend has been enduring, as evidenced by Olajide Aluko’s (1981) argument more than thirty years ago. However, the French have also stepped into the breach when Africa could not. On French intervention in the recent conflict in the Ivory Coast Bovcon says it was timely because of “both the lack of motivation of other international players to act and the inability of African multilateral organizations, such as ECOWAS, to cope with security issues” (Bovcon 2009:1).

The ambivalent stance taken by regional bodies like ECOWAS in West Africa and SADC in southern Africa to deal with African problems could actually provide room for transnational bodies like the United Nations to step in. However, transnational institutions are not infallible. The failure of the United Nations and French forces to forestall and limit the carnage of the Rwandan genocide justifies this point. The withdrawal of French forces especially suggested that African lives were of marginal importance and if saving them poses a threat to Western forces and interests then they could be abandoned. Secondly the size of Rwanda and its limited resources were seemingly not promising any dividends on which Western actors could spend their efforts.

Africa’s Role in Solving African Problems

The African quest to solve African problems predates even independence. Indeed the struggle against colonialism was fought with the conviction that in addition to being a morally repulsive edifice, colonialism was not effective enough to deal with African challenges and to chart a promising future for the continent. The formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 meant to intensify African cohesion and cooperation; the OAU was also charged with gaining and maintaining Africa’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; finally, coming at the time when independence was a reality of few African countries, the OAU had the responsibility of helping other countries to overcome colonialism and after that to obliterate all vestiges of colonial rule. What became the legacy of the OAU was the regrettable failure to stem international and internecine conflict in Africa and the inability to foster intra-national economic development. Furthermore, the extent to which the OAU adhered to maintaining the integrity of kindred nations meant that there was no proper corrective measure for African governments that were a brazen menace to their citizens. The policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs was a sinister policy which abandoned ordinary African people to the whims of their leaders, however brutal and suppressive these leaders may be.
The replacement of the OAU with the African Union in 2002 came with the realization that the OAU had blemishes that were counterproductive to the welfare of Africa. Contrary to the controversial non-interference policy of the OAU, Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union gives AU member states the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” This is an encouraging development because it gives African states oversight even among each other. The AU has sent forces to countries like Sudan, Somalia, the Comoros Islands, Mali and the Central Republic of Africa to manage conflicts.

However, despite the more proactive role of the AU and African regional bodies in suppressing African conflicts and problems in general, the question of who actually directs these missions still lingers. Africa is still underequipped in terms of logistics and still unprepared in terms of financial costs needed to cope with Africa’s travails. Unfortunately, Africa still has to rely on external powers for funding (Vines 2013:107). This means that Africa has to submit its policies and plans to the oversight of those that fund these policies. The logical consequence of this is that external actors/funders wield influence on AU activities. Under current economic circumstances, external funding is crucial to African Union activities (Møller 2009); however, this circumstance puts Africa primacy in conflict resolution in a precarious position (Franke and Romain 2014). Regrettably, African states simply lack the requisite economic muscle needed to surmount African challenges. French intervention in Ivory Coast (Apuuli 2012) and NATO intervention in Libya exposed Africa’s chronic incapability to take a leading role in the activities of the continent, thus providing a defense for foreign intervention.

Thus far, it has hopefully been shown that foreign intervention in Africa is a continuing reality. To foreign actors it has been driven by motivations that are diverse as they are occasionally contradictory. One of the motives behind foreign intervention in Africa comes with the burden and responsibility of colonial history. Colonialism stymied indigenous development in Africa and Africa’s continued travails could be traced to that era. On the other hand, in an international system characterized mainly by self-interest, foreign intervention in Africa has not been altruistic; indeed it has been a self-serving project tailor-made to benefit from African resources. However, an evenhanded assessment of foreign intervention in Africa has to take African complicity into consideration. The Fanonian analysis given in the following section will try to give a psychological analysis of why African leaders have failed to shake off colonial modes of rule, have also failed to develop the continent and have had to revert to the charity of their erstwhile colonial masters.

A Fanonian Interpretation of the African Predicament

An impartial analysis of the poor state of Africa should actually expose the role that African leadership has played. The formative part that European domination has played in hampering African development has been documented (e.g. see Rodney 1972). The following recounts Fanon’s analysis of the postcolonial mind and why Africa still remains hamstrung even after the accession of local leadership.

It is important to note that the explicit criticism of the failure of African leadership by Fanon through his chapter entitled ‘The pitfalls of National Consciousness’ cannot be understood in itself without reference to other works by Fanon. Once we understand this chapter within the other writings of Fanon we will be able to realise that in as much as this is an explicit criticism of African leaders, it also is an implicit pointer of the underlying factors which triggered this failure. The overall understanding of Fanonian writings will point to the fact that these leaders have been psychologically violated which partly explains their incapacity to lead. In other words, the failure is not exclusively blamed on the leaders but also on the colonial-era’s after-effects. What Fanon does is that he, on the one hand, criticises the leaders while, on the other hand, he is giving an explanation of this incapacitation.

In order to understand the underlying explanation of the failure of African leaders according to Fanon, we need to understand the code-word ‘double consciousness’. The concept can be traced back to the work of Du bois entitled *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903). According to Moore (2005), there is not any known documental evidence to indicate the link between Fanon and Du Bois. Double consciousness is a state which displays a contradictory way of understanding one’s identity. It is when one assumes a non-essential identity which is imposed by external forces. The colonial brainwashing of the Western powers on black people constitutes the chief and primary cause of double consciousness according to both Fanon and Dubois.

To understand double consciousness according to Fanon, we have to look at his book *Black Skins and White Mask* written before *The Wretched of the Earth* in which ‘The Pitfalls and National Consciousness’ forms a chapter. The ideas expressed in *The Wretched of the Earth* are built on the fundamental arguments of *Black Skins and White Mask*. The preface of *Black Skins* highlighted that the book investigates the psychology of colonialism by examining how colonialism is unconsciously internalised by the colonialised.

Zahar (1974) pointed out that Fanon’s psychological analysis explains the alienation of black people as a political objective. He conceives racial stereotypes as causes of all kinds of frustrations and complexes which are partly responsible for the inefficiencies of the current African leadership. In a chapter in *Black Skins and White Masks* entitled ‘Negro and Hegel’, Fanon uses Hegel’s analyses of the relationship between the lord and bondmans in his theoretical explanation of the nature of racial colonial subjugation. According to Fanon, the white person accepts the Negro only as a slave. If the freedom of the Negro is given they will not be really free but still remain under the spell of the master’s psychological indoctrination. True freedom or liberation of the Negro cannot be given but demanded. The process of emancipation has to be born out of the struggle of those who are oppressed. According to Fanon in his chapter in the *Wretched of the Earth* called ‘Violence’, the process of colonialism is psychologically violent and as such needs a violent means to be eliminated. Freire (1970, 1993) describes the process of emancipation as synonymous to child birth.

Freire, who confessed to have read Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth*, described the process of emancipation as rigorous. What is interesting about Freire (1970, 1993) is that his explanation of the emancipatory process is similar to the description given by Fanon in *Black Skins and White Mask*.
This possibly tells us that Freire might most probably have read not only the *Wretched of the Earth* but also *Black Skins and White Masks*. Supporting Fanon’s need for a rigorous emancipatory process, Freire pointed out that if the process of emancipation is not adequately followed there is a danger that the person who thinks s/he is oppressed will unconsciously aspire to be like the oppressor. What makes this situation double consciousness is the fact that the oppressed who are not completely free unconsciously oppress their people in the name of liberation. The failure of African leaders can partly be attributed to this explanation.

When Fanon is criticising African leaders for failing to live up to their promises, he is implicitly criticising the colonial methods used to domesticate the black people to unconsciously appreciate violent and oppressive methods of leadership. From this background, the poor performance of African leadership would be understood as a psychological disability created by colonial practise. That this leadership has not alleviated African problems makes foreign intervention to solve African problems appear as a necessity. This infantile dependency of Africa on the West can never be understood as an isolated incident from the colonial indoctrination and domestication. In order for Africa to break out of this vicious circle of a ‘borrowed life’ it is imperative for African leaders to heed the call made by both Fanon and Freire to critically redefine the motives which drive and inspire the agents which shape the nature and form of African leadership.

**Conclusion**

The work set out to respond to the question of why Africa has failed to play a primary role in trying to address African problems. For more times than tolerable, the continent has been proffered solutions from external powers on how to solve Africa’s problems. These solutions have sometimes been foisted on Africa. For example, monetary incentives were given to Africa providing the countries wanting these incentives adhered to prescriptions given by the World Bank, the IMF and the United States Treasury. African input and the specific context of African states were of marginal importance in the implementation of these policies. The failure of SAPs to yield their much-vaunted promises created a blame game wherein their purveyors and those who were to apply them blamed each other. The SAPs, nonetheless, were a clear indication that powerful countries thought they knew what was good for Africa and had the intellect to implement it.

On the other hand, African leaders have always rued the fact that they are usually forced to cope with external intervention in Africa. While this is an understandable attitude, it has increasingly become a futile tantrum when African leaderships are analysed. Postcolonial African leaders have done less to improve Africa’s lot. While much blame should be ascribed to them for this, Fanon’s analysis offers a psychoanalytic explanation to what limits the African mind to go beyond what colonial control exposed it to. As way of conclusion, Africa today is faced with a growing presence of actors that do not come with the badge of colonialism. The increasing presence of Chinese, Indian and Russian corporations and personnel in Africa could repeat much of the abhorred Africa-Western equation, with different players.
To precipitately embrace the new players without first dealing with African leadership offers no real prospect for African progress. Hence, African leadership needs to be understood not only through the way it is expected to execute its duties but also there is a need to explore the invisible influences which determine the way these duties are executed. This presentation has made it its responsibility to use Fanon’s psychoanalysis of the predicament of a black person to understand the predicament of African leadership.

Finally, this paper does not in any way recommend that Africa jettisons all influences and prescriptions that are of Western provenance. It merely states that African notions of solving the problems confronting the continent have to be paid more attention and recognition. There is no reason to reject that from foreign powers that can work in solving Africa’s problems.

Note


References


Murithi, T. 2009. The African Union’s Transition from Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: An Ad Hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect?

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Murithi, T. 2009. The African Union’s Transition from Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: An Ad Hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect?*


