Kwame Nkrumah and Political Marketing: Locating Campaign Strategy in Modern Political Campaigning

by

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Abstract

This research is a contribution to the discourse on Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, his works, visions, ambitions and political ideologies. It argues that discourse on the circumstances and issues that made up the man Nkrumah, sustained and advanced his agenda, has been limited for so long to the thematic areas mentioned above. As important as the above were - and still are to our present time - there is the need for fresh thinking and renewed debate on other areas which also contributed to his success. One of such areas is his campaign strategy which this research advances. Osagyefo’s campaign strategy, essential as it were to his crusade, is under researched and has less featured in our political discourse. Thus the objective of this research, using literature review and interviews as methods, is to identify some of the events, instruments and approaches that were central to Nkrumah’s political campaign. These themes are then analyzed, using theories in modern political campaign paradigm - political marketing in this research - as a framework to arrive at the conclusions. Finally, though the position of this research is envisaged to be criticized by some quarters, the aim is not to avoid attack but to provoke fresh debate on Osagyefo’s campaign strategy, known to be one of the areas that underpinned his success in connecting and engaging the hearts and minds of his ‘allies and enemies’ alike.

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Introduction

In forming the case on Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and political marketing, there are a number of randomly scattered insights in the literature that inform this research.

In this research, it is observed that Osagyefo used imagery and ideas to organize and manage his campaign for the ascension of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) to power- and in fact for the governance of Ghana - before, during and after independence. His approach is thus identified to share borders with modern day political organizational and campaigning strategies, i.e. political marketing which took place some fifty years ago. Although Nkrumah and the CPP party might not have intended their campaign to be a political marketing activity, nevertheless, some pronouncement by Nkrumah and his campaign themes suggest a parallel.

For its aims, this work sets out to identify the conceptual underpinnings that may have informed Nkrumah’s campaign strategy using modern political organizational framework. And second, to demonstrate how political programs could be organized in a systematic way to achieve desired results using a comprehensive organizational strategy of modern political practices. Hence, this paper hopes to provoke fresh debate into other areas of Nkrumah’s political life that are under researched, and prompting new areas of study within academia and among practitioners in the Ghanaian political market in its struggle to entrench Ghana’s nascent democracy.

To achieve the aims above, the research analyzes the political character and behavior of Nkrumah and the CPP party in the tradition of generic functions of political marketing management suggested by Hanneberg (2003), however with some modifications. The paper will consider only four - product function; cost function; communication function; and the distribution function - out of Hanneberg’s eight generic political marketing functions. Another modification is the fusion of Lees-Marshment’s (2001) political market orientation concept, with its emphasis on the identification of customer needs and competitors offering using market research, into the operationalisation of the marketing instruments to realize the desired results. Hence, the inclusion of the market research proposed by Lees-Marshment is crucial because it is only through this means that a competitive benchmark could be set against the actual performance of the party initiating the political marketing program. And although the functions, as Hanneberg explained, are requirements that performances of the instruments are supposed to meet - itself a benchmark - such requirements could only be competitive if they are set against customers’ demands and competitors’ offerings as the Lees-Marshment (2001) concept suggests.
Accordingly, in the next section, I present a brief background to establish the political history of the Gold Coast at a set time to establish a context and facilitate an understanding of the lessons to be drawn from this study.

Background

In 1947, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), a political party made up of elites such as lawyers, doctors and chiefs with the aim of ending British rule – ‘in the shortest possible time’ (Austin, 1961; Vieta, 1999) - invited Kwame Nkrumah into its institutions as an organizing secretary (Austin, 1961). By February 1948, Nkrumah through his organizational style was able to expand the convention to 209 branches across the length and breadth of Ghana, from 13 in 1947 (Vieta, 1999). And, he further encouraged the inclusion of ordinary citizens such as peasant farmers, unions, women’s groups and the youth (Vieta, 1999). This approach was in contrast with the previous regime of UGCC’s organization where the masses were ignored and held in contempt by the political elites (Vieta, 1999). This achievement confirmed Nkrumah’s leadership skills, organizational competence and inclusive philosophy as an individual who saw the ordinary citizen as an important asset to nation building, contrary to the leadership styles of UGCC officials. And moreover, such characteristics won him the admiration of all and the call of the masses to form and lead the Convention People’s party (CPP) in June 1949 when he was expelled from the UGCC (Austin, 1961).

The CPP, contrary to their opponent, the UGCC, had a different strategic approach to politics, campaigning with the ultimate goal of gaining the independence. Thus, the strategic approach that Nkrumah envisaged, formulated and implemented for his party was one that resonated well with the people, and in short, he identified that the needs of the people should be a central approach and should also reflect the political practices of the CPP (www.cppghana.com). Therefore, dialogue among the CPP leaders and the people was encouraged and expressed in a ‘language’ well understood by all, and basically, Nkrumah and the CPP spoke the ‘language’ of the people, not the people speaking the language of Nkrumah and the CPP. This is an era when the average Ghanaian had little knowledge about party politics, but was full of strong feelings towards independence. Therefore, Nkrumah and the CPP capitalized on this strong feeling to adopt the slogan of ‘self government now’ to serve as a guiding principle capable of keeping in focus the central objective; their mobilization for independence within a defined time scale as against the UGCC’s unclear ‘self government in the shortest possible time’ (Austin, 1961; Vieta, 1999) slogan.
Furthermore, Nkrumah’s political domination and insatiable quest for independence did not stop with Ghana. His message reached far and wide across Africa and so did his personality, ideas and organizational skills which led to him being referred to as the ‘greatest African’ by Sekou Toure, then president of Guinea (www.nkrumahconference.com).

The recognition of Osagyefo as ‘Africa’s greatest’ reflects the opinion of, not only his followers and colleagues, but also by others as he stood to be counted in the struggle for Africa’s liberation. And in fact such pronouncements have even been made by his critics no matter how twisted their views tend to be. Hence, I believe that by now we all know the popular phrase - ‘Kwame Nkrumah is one of Africa’s greatest sons, but not one of Ghana’s greatest servants’ (Mazuri, 2002, cited in Otoo, 2006).

In fact, such manifestations was evident when at the turn of the century, African listeners of BBC voted Nkrumah as the ‘African of the century’ (BBC, 1999). Indeed, such an observation by Mazuri and many others, regardless of their opinions on ‘the big Nkrumah debate’ gave especially this writer, a course to study as to why Nkrumah is the ‘greatest African’.

So why was Nkrumah referred to as ‘the greatest African’? The answers, to me lie in the theories and concepts present in literature (Austin, 1961; Monfils, 1977; Vieta, 1999) that give accounts of the activities of Nkrumah. However, the research concludes that going by those accounts present in the literature, referring to Nkrumah as ‘the greatest African’ means that he conveyed images that were African-friendly; it means he lived and accented his ‘African-ness’ before, during and after his time in high public places although he schooled and trained in both the USA and Britain. Finally, it means Nkrumah made Africa and the African people his all important priority. But one would ask what has this got to do with political marketing? This research advances that behind Nkrumah’s style of political organization and management which led to him being referred to as ‘Africa’s greatest’, was his understanding of the fundamental principle of marketing: a ‘market-driven organization stays close to the customer and well ahead of competition’ (Hutt and Speh, 1998, p 226-7) that might have informed his and the party’s political behavior, explicitly or otherwise. This is evident in most of his pronouncements and behavior, some of which were directly parallel:

‘Go to the people, live among them, learn from them, love them, serve them, plan with them, start with what they know, and build on what they have...for the masses of the people form the backbone of our Party. Their living conditions and their welfare must be paramount in everything we do. It is for them in particular and Africa in general, that our party exists’. (Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, 1949). Source: www.cppghana.com
The business of political organization is different from the business of politics and Nkrumah, clearly understanding this terrain of political organization much better than his lawyer and business colleagues at UGCC, and in the words of Austin ‘much better equipped than his Working Committee at UGCC’ (Austin, 1961). His knowledge of party organization - not politics, which they were all at par, it seems (Austin, 1961) - was much deeper and far sighted than the UGCC leadership thought, Austin observes. As, Nkrumah himself acknowledged, ‘it is rather like the dawn of action at the end of a long intensive training - in America and in London, Pan-African meetings, Committee work, Party organization, and a great variety of political activities of one kind and another’ (Nkrumah, cited in Austin, 1977 p295).

Based on these findings, and others not cited in this research, it could be argued that knowingly or otherwise, Nkrumah applied the concept and principles of modern campaign strategies of political marketing way beyond his time when the phenomenon had not even been discovered. If this position is true, as this research initiates Nkrumah could be a pioneer in political marketing’s practice. In achieving this aim, this research combines the literature of political marketing and political science in tracing the confluence of Nkrumah’s political behavior.

Political Marketing Theory

Political marketing in simple terms is a marriage between two social science disciplines - political science and marketing (Lees-Marshment, 2001). It is now an established academic discipline capable that describe and prescribe political behavior (Hanneberg, 2004; Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001) in a democratic polity. Despite the diverse opinion on the discipline (Scammell, 1999; Newman, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Wring, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Butler and Collins, 1999; Hanneberg, 2003), political marketing is most commonly referred to as the ‘adoption’ (Butler and Collins, 1999) - or the ‘adaptation’ (Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001) as many prefer - of commercial marketing concepts and techniques by political actors to organize, implement and manage political activities to realize political goals. Although it is observed as a modern day political organizational practice in the field of politics, some politicians seem somewhat dismissive of the idea in public, due to its commercial undertone, fearing that they will be regarded as abandoning the underlying political philosophies governing the party (O’Cass, 1996). But this position is sharply dismissed by Butler and Collins (1996), advancing that marketing is a constant and necessary political function which politicians attend to implicitly or explicitly, successful or otherwise even though they may not indulge in it at their discretion. Giving this definitive basis of political marketing, then it would be logical for one to ask - what the paradigm consists of, at this juncture.
Political marketing was observed by Maarek (1995) as ‘a genuine policy of political communications and a strategic global approach to the design and conveyance of political messages’. However, Maarek’s view of political marketing, with its emphasis on the design and content of political communication aimed at attracting the attention of the electorates, was found insufficient as an activity of political marketing. This is because communication is located within the framework of promotion; an instrument of the marketing mix. Similarly, Smith and Saunders (1990) trace of political marketing to include image building, issue tracking, voter targeting and timing of elections as central activities of political marketing process was also deemed limited in scope, sharing borders with the same promotional function of the marketing concept but being central to the sales orientation (Lees-Marshment, 2001).

In recent research, experts (Butler and Collins, 1999; Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001) have suggested that political marketing includes managerial, planning and control elements as well as organizational issues (Bowler and Farrell, 1992) before, during and after electioneering campaigning, and even well into governance (Nimmo, 1999). The phenomenon, they argue, could not only be referred to as a discipline ‘largely confined to that formal and stylized period called the campaign’ in its analysis (Butler and Collins, 1996) but to also diverse political activities including fund raising (Steen, 1999), Volunteer mobilization (Lebel, 1999) etc.

Nkrumah and Political Marketing: The Confluence

In his analysis of the generic functions of political marketing management, Hanneberg (2003) suggests that political marketing activities should be considered from a functional perspective that the marketing instruments fulfill instead of the instrumental orientation of traditional marketing theory of product, price, place, and promotion (the 4Ps). In this regard, Hanneberg considers the preconditions that marketing instruments should satisfy. Hanneberg argues that a functional orientation, as against the instrumental orientation, ‘describes the requirements’ needed to achieve a desired results by a political marketing program when certain instruments are operationalised. Using Hanneberg’s model (2003), as well as other concepts and theories (Lees-Marshment, 2001) inherent in the literature, an attempt was made to illustrate how Nkrumah’s campaign organization fit into a modern day political campaign paradigm, and why he could be referred to as one of the pace setters of political marketing.
The Product Function

In his analysis, Hanneberg referred to the political offering as a ‘political service brand’, a view noted by others elsewhere (O’Shaughnessy and Holbrook, 1988; Harrow, 1990; Newman, 1994; Camel, 1999; Lloyd, 2003), to manage voter expectations. The ‘political service brand’ should be of immense value to the recipient (the electorates) and produce by a supplier (political party or a candidate). He therefore concluded that the political product is the combination of certain personal characteristics of the political candidate as the main service delivery personnel, certain political issues – i.e., policy intentions – and ideological framework. These he said, parties need to bring together into a cohesive ‘political service brand’ (Hanneberg, 2003) with the characteristics as ‘public goods’ promised to, and consumed by everyone (Workman, 1989).

In discussing the political product, Hanneberg observed that there are diverse views and themes. However central to most of these views were the brand image of the candidate (Kavanagh, 1995; Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Smith, 2001; Lloyd, 2003) as essential cues that informed voting decisions (Sniderman et al, 1991; Popkin, 1994). Other views also referred to the multi dimensional nature of the party political system (PPS) as the product (Butler and Collins, 1999; Reid, 1988; Wring, 2002a). This view linked the characteristics of the political candidate, the party and its ideology as the political product even though they could be managed separately. It is these views that Hanneberg advances that make up the political product, however with modifications.

Analogous to what Hanneberg sees as the political product was Nkrumah, the CPP and the ‘self government now’ policy as a cohesive offering that initiated the struggle towards independence. The three offered ‘congruence’ in their brand character in drawing support towards the agenda of self government. Although many characters of Nkrumah, for example, might have influenced his support base, however his ‘political service brand’ character could be identified from the literature and be categorized under three main themes as he offered: (1) strong leadership; as he was ready to lead the people to engage the powers that be (the colonial authorities), (2) responsible leadership; as he was prepared to be responsible for his actions and finally and most importantly, and (3) committed leadership to the people who the struggle was with and for the people of the Gold Coast. These brand characteristics resonated well with the mood of the people at the time, and in alignment with both the characterization of the CPP as a party and the time-scaled, ‘self government now’ agenda as a necessary call to end British rule (Austin, 1961, p 283)
Leadership

Nkrumah’s leadership capabilities and qualities though might have shown at a very early stage before his departure to the USA but it was much more evidenced upon his return to the country to join the UGCC. Aside his success to expand the membership and offices of the party in a short period, he is known to have been urging the party to be in a state of readiness to assume governance. He is known to have drawn up a memorandum (Austin, 1961, p 283) urging the formation of a shadow cabinet ‘to forestall any unpreparedness on our part in the exigency of self government being thrust upon us’. In this he called for the co-ordination of existing associations and the opening of branches and weekend schools across the country. Also, Nkrumah is identified with the convening of a constituent assembly of the Gold Coast people to draw up a constitution for self government.

Nkrumah had outlined a number of engagement tools, necessary to initiate the process of self government and was prepared to be held responsible for the outcomes. Some of these were enshrined in his memorandum (Austin, 1961, p 283), calling for demonstrations, boycotts and strikes as ‘our only weapons to support our pressure for self government’. Aside these calls in the memorandum, Nkrumah’s preparedness to accept any responsibility for the outcomes of his or the UGCC leadership’s actions were evident in the way the riot of August 28 was handled. Since the leadership of the UGCC had addressed the ex-service men who marched the previous day, the Watson Commission reported that the leadership of the UGCC was connected to the people’s riot. The UGCC leadership refused to accept responsibility for this accusation but Nkrumah accepted sole responsibility.

The UGCC leadership played the blame game, referring to Nkrumah’s circulated memorandum (detailed above) as responsible for the riot. They claimed they had protested strongly against Nkrumah’s organizational plan of action enshrined in the memorandum; moreover, they had not read it fully and if they had ‘we would have stamped on it’ in the words of one of the leading personalities in the UGCC leadership. Perhaps, one would argue, such traits and environment might have enhanced Nkrumah’s third character - actual and perceived - of shared responsibility and commitment to the course for which the majority supported, and to the people for whom they, Nkrumah and the UGCC leadership, represented.

Commitment

Nkrumah’s actual and perceived commitment to the people of Gold Coast towards the independence project is littered everywhere in the literature, even by his critics. To the course, Nkrumah, admitted to the UGCC as a fulltime secretary to ensure the smooth progress of the work as the UGCC leadership were busy lawyers and businessmen and could only meet once a month (Austin, 1961 p280). Nkrumah’s activeness increased the branches of UGCC to 209 between his arrival in 1947 and 1948 as the convention grew in number and branches flourishing in a number of towns, according to Austin (1961, p285). This effort was well recognized by the leadership of UGCC (Austin, 1961, p285). Nkrumah’s commitment continued unabated well into the formation of the CPP in June 1949, commanding over 60,000 (www.cppghana.com) at the time of its formation.

To the people, Nkrumah’s engagement with them hardly dwindled throughout the struggles. He and his leaders had identified themselves directly with the ordinary working people contrary to the relationship that existed between the UGCC intelligentsia and the people (www.countrydata.com). His several meetings with them, in style and promises appealed directly to them that they saw him as the national leader they could focus their hopes on. Consequently, Nkrumah won the support of influential market women who, through their domination of small-scale trade, served as effective channels of communication at the local level, a number of ex-servicemen, literate persons who had some primary schooling, journalists, and elementary school teachers, all of who had developed a taste for populist conceptions of democracy. And, growing number of uneducated but urbanized industrial workers also formed part of the support group (Austin, 1961; www.countrydata.com).

Reputation

Of all his brand character, it was Nkrumah’s reputation that differentiated him most from the rest of his lawyer colleagues. This reputation was developed through being or (seen as) charismatic, energetic, heroic, youthful, intellectual but ordinary. Features somewhat opposite to that of his lawyer colleagues at UGCC, except the intellectual part. Nkrumah was charismatic; in his speech and in his dressing. He was an icon to many, especially the younger population who had developed a taste for populist conceptions of democracy. He was known to be an orator par excellence, according to Gbedemah ‘he knew how to catch the people’s mind when talking to them’ (Gbedemah: interview with people’s century).

On his dressing, Nkrumah’s selection of dress to suit the occasion and his speech has been observed elsewhere (Monfils, 1977 p314), blending Batakali - the smock worn in northern Ghana, Kente - a significant occasional dress from the south, mostly worn by chiefs - from the south, and a suite – a Western formal clothe. All of these clothes were worn to depict the meaning of the occasion or the function which he attended.

Such practice contributed to his image belonging to the people. Nkrumah’s ordinariness stems from many activities that he engaged in - interactions with the ordinary people and his performance of traditional rituals (Monfils, 1977 p314) - ‘amanmere’ - when in their midst, had contributed to his image and the perception of belongingness amongst the people. Nkrumah’s several arrests (Austin, 1961; Gbedemah interview with people’s century) instead of damaging him, played into his advantage of being a hero that stemmed from his energetic, radical and progressive character.

**The Party as a Product Function**

In analyzing the political product, the character of the CPP party also shared boundary with its other constituent’s part, i.e. Nkrumah and the policy intention of ‘self government now’, as a political product. Although the above characteristics of Nkrumah - leadership, commitment, reputation also manifested in the character of CPP, however, other character traits such as progressive, robust and inclusive, were identified with the CPP party. These characteristics made the party seem ready, prepared and committed to the challenge of the common course that the people of Gold Coast shared. These characteristics are evident in Nkrumah’s statement when he identified the need for such an institution capable of driving the interest of the people as a collective goal. And this he observed as one of the needs of the people in the following quote ‘mass movements are well and good, but they can not act with purpose unless they are led and guided by a vanguard political party’ (Austin, 1961 p 295). Nkrumah identified the need for some kind of an organization, with the characters identified above, to mobiles into a cohesive fashion when grass roots nationalism as ethnic and regional groups were getting stronger.

**Inclusivity**

The organizational character and structure of the CPP impacted well on its formation as a mass party. As a socialist democratic party, the CPP’s all inclusive character motivated the entry of people of different identities and levels leading to its identity as a party of a true national character (Gbedemah: interview with the people’s century). Its membership involved market women, ex-servicemen, literate persons who had some primary schooling, journalists, and elementary school teachers, a growing number of uneducated but urbanized industrial workers also formed part of the support group as well as the ‘veranda boys’ - a group of mostly young political professionals - as they came to be known (www.counrtydata.com).
The ‘inclusivity’ character of the party was not only limited to its admissions of membership, but was translated into the decision making process. These groups contributed to the decision making process of the party. According to Nkrumah, even the party name, Convention Peoples Party (CPP) ‘was arrived at after much discussion with the people’ (Austin, 1961 p296). The process was to find a name that could ‘carry the masses with us’. The leadership of the CPP also had the character as its membership, made up of ordinary citizens, for example Botsio, Gbedemah etc as compared to the UGCC elites. This characterization made it easy for the leadership to identify themselves with the ordinary citizenry, and within a very short time, the party had mass followings.

**Progressive and Robust**

Second, it is no doubt that the ‘self government now’ policy - a time-frame objective - and the radical stance evident in positive action and the like, adopted by the party, as against the modest version of the UGCC intelligentsia (Austin, 1961) contributed to CPP’s direction and speed. Thus, the urge was on to achieve a said objective within a time frame beyond which no one could wait, not even some of the young ‘conventionist’ like Sakyi Scech.

**Policy Intentions as a Product Function**

The clarity and timeliness of the CPP policy towards the struggle for independence might have contributed immensely to CPP’s fortunes of support. The political market of Gold Coast was highly unorganized, full of resentment, discontent, diverse on ethnic shades but with one purpose: to attain self government. Although the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947 had first identified the need for self government, their policy of ending the British rule ‘in the shortest possible time’ was later found unclear and not good enough for the people to buy into. It was found vague and much more confused. This led to a situation when in 1949 people within the UGCC party, like Sacki Schech demanded a target date for independence. He therefore threatened that if by April 1st ‘we haven’t got self government; we shall begin to free ourselves according to our own proclaimed program of action’ (Austin, 1961).

Nkrumah on the other hand, offered a policy towards independence within a time frame and an effective organizational machine capable to mobilize this diverse society towards the common independent objective. As a response, in June 1949 the CPP was formed and adopted ‘self government now’, a policy that the majority of the people wanted, as opposed to the unclear ‘self government in the shortest possible time’ by the UGCC.
Thus, this research argue that although the ideological position of Nkrumah, i.e., his social democratic view which later became Nkrumaism (Monfils, 1977 p326-327) might have contributed to shaping his political agenda and that of the CPP machinery, it did little to shape the motivation of the electorates in ‘buying’ the political product that they offered. It was rather his understanding of the fundamental marketing principle of ‘understanding the needs of the customer’ (Dipp et al, 2001) (identified above in the introduction) that informed his tactics of mobilizing support.

This conclusion is reached based on some pronouncements by Nkrumah (Monfils, 1977), that party political culture and its associated ideological languages of the left and the right, socialist and capitalist were difficult for the average Gold Coast person to comprehend let alone to use as a measure for political self identification. However, characters such as commitment, leadership style, inclusiveness and progressiveness that Nkrumah and the CPP were identified with as explained above had meanings that everyone, literate or illiterate, politically savvy or otherwise, could understand and make sense out of. They enhanced the image of Nkrumah as a candidate and that of the CPP party as trust level amongst the people were high. They were seen as those that could deliver ‘the public goods’ when in government even though they have not been tried and tested in government before. Thus, this research advances that the above characteristics might have contributed to Nkrumah and the CPP’s ‘political brand equity’ needed to shift the voter demand curve to their advantage in maximizing the share of the political market against the competition.

The Distribution Function

The distribution function is regarded as the conditions that make available the exchange offer to the exchange partner, usually considered via the ranks and file members of a party (Hanneberg, 2003), and thus the ‘distribution of candidate as a product surrogate through speaking events, rallies etc’ (Hanneberg, 2003) and the political grass roots that provide local electioneering support, canvassing and leafleting for the party campaign (Harris, 2001b; Wring, 2000a) as the primary channels of distribution.

According to Hanneberg, the distribution function could be divided into two main sub groups: the campaign delivery and the offering delivery. The campaign delivery provides the primary exchange partner (the electorates) with access to all relevant information regarding crucial political policies on important agenda points. This channel could be explained as a means of conveying political message and delivery to voters ranging from right access to media space and time, to the readership and circulation capacity of political messages, juxtaposing the shelf space of political bulletins and newspapers, and the availability of candidate in many communities as possible for engagement and interaction with electorates, and the use of simple and common language that everyone could understand, and make sense out of (a process Hanneberg recommends within an ideological umbrella).
In the above context, a network of different social groups connected with the common aim of ‘self government now’ throughout the country and thus became an integral part of the CPP machinery. And popular amongst this network were the C.Y.O, a youth group that formed the base of the CPP with other young political professionals; influential market women who through their domination of small-scale trade served as effective channels of communication at the local level, coupled with a number of ex-servicemen, literate persons with some primary schooling, journalists, and elementary school teachers, who developed a taste for the populist conceptions of democracy (Austin, 1961). Notwithstanding, a growing number of uneducated but urbanized industrial workers who formed part of the support group that actively championed this course of action in various ways.

On the other hand, the offering delivery is referred to as the fulfillment of the political promises (Harrop, 1990; Palmer, 2002). Though as part of the delivery process that could motivate political participation, its justification can only occur when the party has the political and legal mandate to fulfill the promises, i.e. when in governing position. However such a motivation could be derived from the reputation of the principal political actors of the party. As Scammell (1999) observed, just like the service industry (Scammell 1999), reputation is what political parties need in justifying performance when they are voted to power.

This could be derived from past performance in governance, influential socio-economic positions, historic profiles of the political actor and associations with key political figures. In recent times, skills, qualifications, discipline and the international profiles of party candidates also contribute to parties gaining the reputation needed in seeking political office. In this regard, the offering delivery of Nkrumah and the CPP when in government could only be justified based on the characteristics of leadership and commitment to the people with an inclusive progressiveness as well as Nkrumah’s known record as a Pan African activist connected to well known speakers of Black liberation like George Padmore, W.E.B Du Bois and other via his associations with activities connected to African liberation whilst in the USA, and the United Kingdom.

The Cost Function

Although it remains the most elusive as a political marketing instrument, the most pivotal in the exchange notion is a number of concepts are proposed to ensure that the cost function is well defined to suit the character of politics. Hanneberg refers to it as the management of actual and perceived attitudinal and behavioral barriers on the part of voters. He argues that for the price factor to reflect well on the political character, there is the need for redefining price element to mean ‘cost’ or ‘sacrifice’ (Hanneberg, 2003). Niffenegger (1989), on the other hand has defined the price/cost concept as the psychological construct made up of ‘voters feelings of national, economic, and psychological hope or insecurity’.

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In the case of the struggle towards independence, on both dimensions, whether hope or insecurity, Nkrumah and the CPP could be said to have offered a long sighted binoculars’ through which the people could see where their future laid.

The weaknesses of the UGCC and the danger of electing them were broadly beamed for the people to avoid voting them to power. Whereas the opportunities for voting Nkrumah and the CPP were as clear as broad daylight, well ahead of them. So the choice were theirs (the people of Gold Coast) to make it happen. Thus, opposition research on the UGCC was utilized fully by Nkrumah and the CPP to their advantage, and it is recorded that the relationship between the UGCC leadership and the colonial authorities were explored by Nkrumah as a threat to the political interest of the colony.

In one instance, the UGCC had agreed that Sir Sydney Abrahams speak on the party’s platforms. Knowing this, Nkrumah and the CPP leadership, through their party mechanisms publicized that the leadership of the UGCC are ‘in bed’ with the government of the United Kingdom, and that they were supposed to divert the people’s attention from seeking their independence to sports (Austin, 1961, p291). The accusation inevitably might have caused untold damages on the image of the UGCC, eventually leading to its departure with the C.Y.O and the formation of the CPP.

The Communication Function

Perhaps, a strategic element of Nkrumah’s political campaign was his personality and his ability to present his message well. Seen as an orator par excellence, Nkrumah did not only know his content, he knew his audience and the setting. This often mistaken to be a manipulative tendencies employed by the Osagyefo to win over his followers, and to many of his critics, it was seen as a negative (Monfils, 1977). But what is the essence of communication any way? One would ask.

Hanneberg (2003), in his generic political marketing analysis, refer to the communication function as informing the primary exchange partners of the offer and its availability characterized by the provision of political content - image and cues. This also aids the interpretation and sense making of the complex political market (Kotler and Kotler, 1999), and it involves a simplification of political messages; forming succinct political stances at its best, and sound bites at its worst (Wortmann, 1989; Harris, 2001b).

At CPP, Nkrumah and the party adopted a clear and effective communication and organization principles in conveying and collecting information to and from the people that adopted clear cut, progressive slogans - ‘self government now’, ‘forward ever, backward never’ - (www.cppghana.com) offering clear guidance to the achievements of their common objectives and goals. Thus these were short, clear and a simple sentence that even the ordinary electorate could comprehend.
They translated these slogans in many languages and carried through many distribution channels with specific and concise pledges that could be kept that bordered on issues and areas of importance to the voters. Such pledges, in a form of a mini-manifesto, were found daily in the newspapers. For instance, the Accra Evening News long before the election time was instrumental in fulfilling the above (Monfils, 1977). Nkrumah’s commitment to the process and to the indigenous people was also evident through his regular engagement with ordinary citizens across the country, as he shared his visions and agenda.

But, the communication function is not only for the promotional instrument of the 4Ps to fulfill. And so are the other functions not specifically for the respective instruments. Conversely, according to Hanneberg (2003), the relationship between the functions is not linear as different instruments can contribute to different functions. He observed that the mix nature of the marketing instruments ensures the interaction between the communication and the distribution functions. Where communication provides the content, distribution offers the channel through which the message is relayed. Finally, the communication function prescribes a dialogue among the political actors and the primary exchange partner, ensuring the creation of a good relationship through a multi directional flow of information and a shared agenda.

Perhaps, the most sophisticated amongst the communication function was his use of psychology of emotions (Richards, 2004) as a campaign delivery tool, not only to convey political messages, but to also ‘implant’ political needs that would satisfy people through the same means. According to Richards (2004) consumer needs have largely been created and satisfied by products and services through the use of symbolic associations, images and personalities. Through advertising (a communication function), the need to belong, to feel secure and to have, is created by a product in the consumer with the use of images of public figures especially, people that audience can identify with. Through the same medium, the product is seen to satisfy those self-created needs. This virtual creation and satisfaction of needs, advertisers believe, impact on consumers’ response in demanding such products. This is because; as it has been observed (Richards, 2004) ‘audiences identify with the people (images) in the media, i.e. advertisement.

Not only could Nkrumah identify the inherent need of the people with the principal of self government, however, he also created sub needs that he was the current and future solution using a psychology of emotions (Richards, 2004) to make the people aware of their security as they headed towards an unknown destination (an independent state). Thus, these needs were satisfied, though virtually, just as they were created, by Nkrumah’s real and perceived characteristics via his optimistic leadership character which may have offered a solution to ‘the feel of insecurity’ entertained by the people of Gold Coast.
His reputation then might have also boosted the trust level of the people, anticipating a just government that will offer ‘public goods’ to the benefit of all the colonial authorities and the ‘opportunistic’ leadership of the UGCC.

**Conclusion**

Although Nkrumah, like many other politicians (Butler and Collins, 1996; O’Cass, 1996), may not have ‘consciously made marketing decisions’ (Hanneberg, 2003) on his political organizational strategy, ‘through the lens of hindsight’ (Lilleker and Negrine, 2003), it can certainly be argued that he followed a marketing-led approach (Lees-Marshment, 2001). In this research, it is observed that Nkrumah’s campaign strategy was inherent with some principal marketing concepts. The first is the identification and understanding of the needs of the Gold Coast people and the fulfillment of such needs through the operationalization of activities analogous to the marketing instruments of product, price, place and promotion (the 4Ps) as identified above. This research also shows that Nkrumah identified that the ultimate need of the people of Gold Coast was freedom through independence from the colonial authorities; however such need was inconclusive in itself with other needs such as the need to feel secure; to belong and to have leaders who they (the Gold Coast people) could feel who are just like them but could lead because of their exceptional qualities (Richards, 2004). These needs, Nkrumah acknowledged, and preceded the ultimate need for freedom, and fulfillment crucial in gaining the confidence, trust, support and the mandate of the people in securing the ultimate need of independence. These needs, he observed could be achieved even before being in government. Arguably, this observation, amongst others, may have influenced his leadership, organizational and communicational style that characterized his political image, the party, and the CPP leadership.

Undoubtedly, Nkrumah had some understandings on the above identified marketing concepts and their application to commercial organizational process, stemming from his involvement in the publication of the Accra Evening News (Austin, 1961; Monfils, 1977). The publication and the sales of his newspaper may have contributed to Nkrumah’s knowledge in understanding the sort of news that could attract his customer target; appropriate distribution, promotion and pricing decisions capable to realize a sale. Nkrumah may have transferred this knowledge into the political domain. Nkrumah’s understanding may have also been influenced by his experience in the United State and the United Kingdom, where commercialization is immense and the use of marketing concepts was in common although was not at its best compared to today’s standards.
In conclusion, Osagyefo’s political campaign and organizational strategies identified in this paper happened some fifty years ago, yet can still be located within a modern day political campaign paradigm and thus relevant to today’s political domain. However, the limitation of this research, using only secondary data in the form of literature review as method, prevents this research from drawing a conclusive parallel between Nkrumah’s organizational and campaign strategy and that of a comprehensive political marketing strategy in the tradition of Lees-Marshment (2001). Hence, it is recommended that further research, with empirical findings identifying the various stages and activities of Nkrumah’s organizational and campaign program be conducted to advance this study. And in this context, I am sure the results would be relevant to both academia and practitioners of Ghanaian politics in the search for entrenching Ghana’s democracy.

**Recommendation**

The growing sophistication of today’s electorates has compelled politicians to turn to marketing as an alternative source of understanding voter behavior in order to meet and satisfy their demands. Political marketing is now seen as a comprehensive political management strategy (Newman, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Scammell, 1995; Wring, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001) that can offer a systematic approach to manage political activities to achieve timely results (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Hanneberg, 2003).

However, if a political marketing program employed by a political party or a candidate for whatever activity of political organization - as a campaign management program (Newman, 1994; Scammell, 1995; Kavanagh, 1995; Wring, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Hanneberg, 2003), fund raising (Steen, 1999) or volunteer support mobilization (Lebel, 1999) - certain core principles of the marketing orientation have to be observed to achieve the objective. Hence, the way forward is to ensure the coordination of marketing instruments (Wortmann, 1989) as observed in the original literature of the marketing mix of 4Ps (Borden, 1964), now extended to 7Ps (Booms and Bitner, 1982) to make it more relevant to the service market. This coordination ensures that the fulfillment of functions are not carried out by the marketing instruments in separate ways but in a complementary manner to achieve synergy in results since functions could be fulfilled by different marketing mix instruments (Hanneberg, 2003).

It is also recommendation that political marketing instruments be operational with fundamental market orientation principles (Lees-Marshment, 2001) in mind - focusing on the needs of the electorate in relation to the political competition. This means, the ultimate need of the electorates should be identified and analyzed into sub needs to be attributed to, and fulfilled by the individual instruments of the marketing mix.
Thus the fulfillment of these sub categories of needs by the instruments, in coordination as discussed above, should result in the satisfaction of the ultimate need of the customer at the end of the political programme. And the operation of these instruments should be measured against the competitors to ensure that customers are not attracted to the competitors’ offering.

And finally, one must ensure that the entire process is embedded with market research activities (Lees-Marshment, 2001) identify the requirements of the electorates, in terms of their needs, and thus serve as a benchmark in measuring success within political marketing activity juxtaposing the competition.

References


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“The Birth of CPP” (WWW document) URL: Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. (Visited 30/01/07).

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