Phenomenal Consciousness: An Alternative Healing Method for Mental Illnesses

by

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Abstract

The paper researches the debates between physicalists such as Paul and Patricia Churchland and the anti-physicalists such as Frank Jackson, about the possibility of the complete empirical explanation and reduction of the nature and property of subjective consciousness. The paper argues that phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained or reduced by physicalist which raises the issue of the need for psycho-mental experts and/or psychiatrics to enhance their expertise with an understanding of the nature and characteristics of phenomenal consciousness as an alternative healing method for psycho-mental illnesses in Africa, and in Nigeria particularly.

Key words

Qualia; phenomenal experience; what it is to see red; raw feels; Physicalists and anti-physicalists; fi ese ile to; o ni owo ninu; Yorubaland.
Introduction

The mind-body problem remains a puzzle to the metaphysicians, epistemologists, psychologists, and scientists. Several attempts have been made by those theorists to proffer possible solutions to the problem. Currently, attention has been focused on consciousness as an alternative means of getting through the problem. Current debates on the problem of mind-body center on understanding the nature and property of consciousness, and how such an understanding could be used to solve the mind-body puzzle. Prominent in the debate are the physicalists (i.e., people who hold the view that all phenomena can be described in terms of space) and the anti-physicalists. The physicalists argue that the property of consciousness can be completely explained empirically, for example, by the physical or the neurological processes of the brain, while the anti-physicalists argue that there are some properties of consciousness, which physical explanation cannot capture, such as qualia or phenomenal consciousness.

In this paper, some of the various arguments of the physicalists that contend that consciousness is nothing over and above physical and neural processes of the body shall be examined. I wish to make my submission that consciousness and qualia are as puzzling as the mind-body problem, and then support the anti-physicalists to argue that physicalists’ explanations fail to adequately explain the nature and property of consciousness without leaving something out. Then, I will substantiate my argument in the persistent case of mental and related illness in Nigeria, and claim that the understanding of the nature of qualia or the phenomenal aspect of consciousness may qualitatively assist the psychological and medical experts to solve the mind-body puzzle.

Positioning

The causal characterization of consciousness has been argued to be explainable by physicalist theory. Consider Chalmers as explained by Guzeldere. He argues that causal consciousness concerns all explanations about various cognitive functions such as discriminatory abilities, reportability of mental states, the focus of attention, and the control of behaviour, which he claimed are explainable scientifically (Guzeldere, 1997, p. 29). However, some arguments adduced by the physicalists, i.e., Paul and Patricia Churchland, Gulick and others, against qualia or phenomenal consciousness are insufficient to explain phenomenal consciousness without leaving something out. Thus, I will take some of the physicalists’ core arguments and attempt to show their weaknesses.

Before I proceed to the argument proper, it is expedient that I make myself clear on what I mean by the concept ‘qualia’, ‘raw feels’ or ‘phenomenal consciousness’. Guven Guzeldere presented the concept ‘qualia’ as “experiences have phenomena and thus non-causal, non-representational, non-functional, and perhaps non-physical properties” (Guzeldere, 1997, p. 37). And Michael Tye defines ‘phenomenal character’ as the “immediate subjective ‘feel’ of experience” (Tye, 2003, p 619).
However, to make the properties of qualia capture its central point, I include ‘non-intentional’, because a complete and healthy person must unintentionally and involuntarily feel or experience pain when pinched. Besides, some phenomena feels are representational in the sense that a certain image may accompany the experience such as what a person experiences after receiving a very violent slap on the face, or in the experience of mental-picturing.

Hence, the physicalists objected in various ways to the popular ‘knowledge argument’ by Frank Jackson (Jackson, 1995, pp 185-189) to show that physicalists’ explanation will leave something out of consciousness, unexplained and then unreduced. Thus, the hypothetical Mary was brought up in an enclosed black and white environment where she, for whatever reason, learns everything (neurobiological and neurophysiological) there is to know about the nature of human mental processes. For example, she is an expert at explaining what happens in the mental aspect of human beings through neurological processes during vision, pain, mental picturing, thinking, reasoning, and other mental experiences that characterize human beings. In spite of this, it is argued that since Mary learns something new after her release, she did not know everything (via her physicalist theory) about human mental experience. The argument concludes that there are some truths about human mental experience which the physicalist theory could not explain.

Consequently, a series of objections have been adduced towards this theory. According to Lewis (1988) and Nemirow (1990) via the ‘ability hypothesis’, Mary does not acquire any new propositional knowledge after her release, “but only a bundle of abilities (like the ability to imagine, remember and recognize colours or colour experience” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002). Thus, Lewis and Nemirow presuppose that Mary’s epistemic progress after release consists in the acquisition of knowing what it is like (e.g. to have an experience of blue) and they both claim that knowing what it is like is to have certain practical abilities (Nida-Rumeline, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002). And according to Nemirow “knowing what an experience is like is the same as knowing how to imagine having the experience” (Nemirow, 1990). And for Lewis (1983), ‘Knowing what it is like is the possession of abilities; abilities to recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities to predict one’s behaviour by imaginative experiments” and the ability to represent a certain experience of color with a certain neurological process going on in her brain.

There are series of faults in the quotes above, therefore I will single out Nemirow’s quote and do a brief analysis. I wonder if ‘Knowing what an experience is like’ is the same as ‘knowing how to imagine having the experience’. Thus, my question is; in what sense did Nemirow use this same as or sameness? Did Nemirow mean sameness as in identity? Or did he mean sameness as in A belonging to or implying B? He could not mean identity because certainly, the two clauses fail to fulfill the law of identity. If he means the law of the indiscernibility of identicals, then the first clause must share the same qualities with the second clause. It certainly seems to me that knowing what, is saying something of definitional knowledge. This deals with an ability to define a certain phenomenon or property, probably in terms of its constituents.

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Here we can see that definition is different from description and that the two do not necessarily share the same qualities. Did Nemirow mean A belongs to or implies B as an analytic statement? For this to happen the meaning of the first clause must be contained in the other clause and therefore making the truthfulness or falsity of such to become strictly necessary such that the denial becomes self-contradictory (Kant, 1963), not minding Quine’s question of the term ‘necessary’, which is also confirmed by Grice and Strawson. But it is evident that no amount of analysis of knowing what an experience is, can give one the meaning of knowing how to imagine the experience. Therefore with this brief analysis it is not clear in what sense Nemirow used his ‘same as’ or ‘sameness’ as the case may be.

Instructionally, a blind man from birth can perhaps; it must be agreed, be taught, over time, all the propositional knowledge in the physicalist theory about colour and mental experience. The whole exercise becomes difficult if not impossible, when the teacher attempts to teach how exactly it feels when one sees a certain colour red or when one has a certain mental raw feels. What are the concepts that would be employed to describe how it feels and what it is like to see red? It seems to me that such an attempt will end in futility. Physicalists, such as neurologists, study the firing and movement of neurons of the brain during a certain mental experience, while other physicalists do so by empirical means. In this context, I think there also ought to be some movements (neural or others) in the brain during perception or other mental experience. But the ‘raw feels’ or ‘what it is to see red’ is completely out of context, because no amount of their study would be sufficient to objectively capture and explain it.

Perhaps, as Todd C. Moody noted, the “consciousness, phenomenal consciousness in this case, just is not like anything else” (Moody Todds, 1986), and therefore can’t be completely reduced to or explained in physicalist terms. A view C.D. Broad supported, when he argued that mere propositional knowledge or sight of ammonia could not supply any clue of what its smell is like unless one has the phenomena experience of the smell oneself. And third, a view shared by John Puddefoot when he addresses the qualia problem, stating that “you may very well somehow see certain parts of my brain operating in ways that suggest that I am seeing, hearing, smelling something, but that knowledge will neither allow you to tell what I am seeing, nor how I am seeing it and what impact the experience is having on me (Puddefoot, 1996)”. In contrast, Paul Churchland presents a fallacious argument in “the objective qualia (redness, warmth etc)” which should have never been “kicked inwards to the mind of observers” and confronted squarely to be placed outside the human observer. Hence, if objective phenomenal properties are so treated, then subjective qualia can be confronted with parallel forthrightness, and can be reduced where they stand; inside the human observer. So far then, the external and the internal case are not different: they are parallel after all” (Churchland Paul, 1985, p 19), which can solve the problem because it is unclear how that line of reasoning can move from the fact that objective qualia can be reduced to the idea that the subjective phenomenon of experience can be reduced as well. Therefore, it is fallacious to argue that what happens to A must happen to B where A and B have different properties.
In fact, it is even appropriate to use the words of Richard Double “Let us admit that it is unclear how a physical entity could be phenomenal”5 (Double Richard, 1985) to control Churchland’s assumption. Second, I wish to pick one important argument of Paul Churchland against Jackson and try, if I may, to relay the apparent inconsistency in it. To argue that the source of what Mary lacks is explainable physically, he argued that: Mary has a deprived upbringing; the subspaces in the cortical vector of her brain where other colours (for example red colour) impulse, apart from black and white, from the retina could be represented were not formed; without the subspaces, the impulses of colour from the retina could not be represented; without the impulses represented in the brain, the colour experience could not be had; and therefore, Mary could not form the experience of other colours before her release. That is why, for him, Mary learns a new experience of red colour when she is released.

However, for me, a different argument with a different conclusion may be constructed to describe Mary’s situation; a certain colour can be experienced when its subspace had been previously formed in the brain vector; no colour can be duly experienced if its subspace had not been previously formed in the brain vector; Mary did not have the subspaces for other colours (apart from black and white) formed in her brain vector before her release; and therefore, Mary could not experience other colours even when she is released.

Given this, how can it be argued that Mary experiences colour red when released, as Churchland did, since the subspace for such colours had not been previously formed in her vector? Going by this argument, Mary could not experience any other colour apart from black and white or grey, when released. In fact, any other colour will just be either white or black to her, because there are no spaces or spots where other colours will be represented in her brain. She would have to be told what other colours are. Even when told, she would not be able to experience it since there are no spaces or spots to represent such experience in her brain vector. My submission is that since the spots where other colours are to be represented are not formed in Mary’s brain, and then when released, she would not be able to experience other colour apart from those two.

Here, Paul Churchland argues that immediately Mary was released and experienced red colour, and that the subspace for it was instantly formed in her brain vector and explains why what she newly learns is complex. Hence, her the formation of the subspaces for other colours, like red is a new experience wherein she experiences new colour impulses different from black and white, and she learns a new acquaintance and phenomena of the feel of the colour red. This experience is distinctly new; an area previous neurological study did not cover. If physicalism is adequate here, the descriptive and propositional knowledge should be enough to allow Mary to form the experience before her release. Second, if Churchland argues that Mary would have the subspace for a certain colour only after such colour is experienced; this is very similar to Jackson’s argument. This is true because by implication, Churchland agreed that no amount of propositional or descriptive (physical) explanation can afford the knowledge of the experience of a certain colour which one has not experienced, a position close to the argument of Jackson. Ironically, it seems to by opening this argument, Churchland is indirectly supporting Jackson, although the physicalists argue contrary to Jackson, that that knowledge by acquaintance is explainable by physicalism.

Patricia Churchland on Reductionism

Patricia Churchland’s argument raises fundamental questions about the problem of the philosophy of mind. She claimed that the fact that a particular problem defies a priori solution does not indicate it as insurmountable. For her, science could also provide solutions to some of the philosophical problems which a priori reasoning cannot solve. For instance, she approached the problem of mind-body from a scientific perspective and claimed that reductionism is the solution to that problem.

Before I examine the argument, it is, indeed, necessary for me to clarify what is meant by the concept ‘reductionism’. Reductionism is achieved when a certain phenomenon is either described or explained in another phenomenon without leaving anything out. There are different types of reductionism; explanatory, ontological, eliminative, logical, descriptive, etc. Logical reductionism attempts to give the analysis of a certain phenomenon A in terms of another phenomenon B without leaving anything out unanalyzed. Ontological reductionism occurs when a certain phenomenon is observed to be nothing over and above the other phenomenon. Eliminative reductionism occurs when the language of one phenomenon can be translated into the language of other phenomenon without any remnant. Descriptive and linguistic reductionisms are already explained in my initial exposition. But in Patricia Churchland’s project, different reductionist approaches were used depending on a person’s perspective of the paper. Some of the main approaches used are explanatory, eliminative, and descriptive.

Now, Patricia Churchland argued in favour of the hypothesis that every property identified with consciousness can be reduced to the properties of the neurophysiological and neurobiological processes in the human brain. In other words, what is called consciousness or mental states could be the object of study of the interaction of neurons in the human brain. Crick and Llinas hypotheses on visual awareness and sleep, dream and waking experiences (SDW) respectively are examples used to argue that mental experiences are nothing over and above neural processes in the human brain. She further argued that scientists do not argue that they have been able to explain everything about consciousness, but given the progress that science is making and the latest discoveries, they are working towards making the hypothesis true. She argued,

Additionally, I am convinced that the right strategy for understanding psychological capacities is essentially reductionist, by which I mean (broadly) that, understanding the neurobiological mechanisms is not a frill but a necessity. Whether science will finally succeed in reducing psychological phenomena to neurobiological phenomena is, needless to say, yet another empirical question.  

In fact, I am aware of the fact that Patricia Churchland did not directly write on qualia but on consciousness in general. However I assume that whatever affects consciousness in general correspondingly affects qualia, and it is upon this assumption that I am responding to Churchland’s reductionism arguments. It seems that for reductionism to take place, there must be more than one phenomenon or substance involved. And for a successful and adequate reductionism, which Churchland claimed, there must be adequate knowledge of the properties of each of the phenomena and or substances involved. For instance, for water to be completely reduced to $\text{H}_2\text{O}$, the properties of hydrogen and oxygen should each be sufficiently understood. In the light of the above explanation, the neurobiologist must first of all present a sufficient explanation of the properties of the phenomena which they want to reduce, that is, an adequate explanation of the property of consciousness and that of the property of the brain. It is an important step. Without it, their reductionism will certainly get nowhere. We, on our part, may not do more than give an ostensive description of such property, because it is not implicitly contained in the concepts we bring to bear in our first-person ascription (Meginn, 1997, p 532). However that is considered a big weakness of such a claim as Kelly Jolley and Michael Watkins have rightly said “And what is a problem for the friends is also a problem for their enemies.

If the problem cannot be stated then any attempt to solve the problem will seem to miss the mark”7. But, it is my view that if a complete and sane person is pinched with a pin, he will certainly know what it is to experience pain. That question of what it is to experience pain itself remains a puzzle. In fact, the nature of the problem of is put in better perspective by some phenomenologists such as Jolley and Watkins;

The thought (of qualia) is difficult to express, but apparently easy to hold. It is not simply that any scientific account of the mind or brain will necessarily leave something out...The thought, rather, is that we can never capture propositionally, scientifically or otherwise, the richness or kind of information presented by experience. What, exactly, can we not capture propositionally? Well, that is also difficult to capture. Words cannot adequately express a problem concerning a purported feature of experience that words cannot adequately describe. The qualia problem itself, then, is a qualia problem. We might think of it as the meta-qualia problem. (Kelly Dean and Michael Watkins, 1998, pp 204-205).

It is clear therefore according to them that though experience teaches so many things, it cannot teach phenomenology. Terence Horgan also partly shares this view; Some philosophers, myself inclusive, believe that although functionalism is plausible as regards certain aspects of mentality, nevertheless, there is one aspect that is incapable, in principle, of being analysed functionally: viz, the qualitative, or phenomenal content of our mental states, i.e., what it is like to undergo these states. (Hogan Terence, 1984, pp 453-469). Some people even argue that it is possible that it is a pseudo-problem. But, I want to say that the fact that we have not been able to give an explicit and convincing explanation now does not mean that it is a pseudo-problem.
Now, how easy would it be for the physicalists to give a detailed explanation of those properties? I may have to agree with McGin and probably with other physicalist who hold that “it must be in virtue of some natural property of the brain that organisms are conscious”\(^8\). But also according to Patricia Churchland, “… in a profound important sense we do not understand exactly what, at its higher levels, the brain really does”\(^9\). Two things may be inferred from this quote. One, since a reductionist like Churchland could say this, then, it strictly follows that an adequate and complete explanation of the properties and functions of the brain might be difficult if not impossible to provide. Two, if they could not present a sufficient explanation of an objective phenomenon, like the brain; if they are being deceived by what they passionately claim, how much less or even impossible is it going to be for them, then, to give such a convincing explanation of phenomena consciousness without leaving anything out. Then, if this is the case, where is the possibility of reductionism? Then, how sound would the argument appear that they want to reduce two different phenomena whose properties they will understand? It seems to me that the project will achieve little or nothing.

Again, if at the higher order level we (human beings) are “cognitively closed” to the nature and function of the brain, then, is it not arguably possible that in the final and complete analysis of the brain, it may be that there are some properties of the brain capacity which are qualitatively subjective and in which no amount of objective research and or explanation may be epistemically sufficient to adequately describe it without leaving something out? It is possible. Therefore, it is arguable that qualia and its properties are exclusively beyond the scope of the limited objective explanations of the physicalists reductionists.

To show the potency in the above argument, I wish to argue from the viewpoints of Thomas Nagel\(^10\), McGinn\(^11\), and George Graham, that in saying that qualia cannot be explained by the physicalist, I do not mean that if the brain surgeon were to open my brain when, for example, I am drinking Coke or Fanta, he would not see neural processes going on, in fact this is consistent with the empirical mechanism of human being. I mean that he would not be able to see the sweet experience or taste which I have at that time: that is what I am saying.

We mean that qualia are interior with a type of interiority that is different from the way that our neurons are inside our head. Qualia are inside in the sense that there is something it is like to experience sweet taste, and there is no obvious reason to think that this inside something can be open to public inspection (Graham, 1993).

Then, it may be argued that scientific discoveries are still in progress and it may be possible sometime in the future that physicalism may be able to give the so called adequate explanation about the property of qualia. I want to say that if science is going to explain property of qualia completely, it would first of all have to explain completely, the property and nature of consciousness to which qualia is just an aspect. But, can I not argue like McGinn, that the human brain capacity at its higher level is deficient and limited such that it cannot achieve this task since “… in a profound important sense we do not understand exactly what, at its higher levels, the brain really does”?

May be not, but it is also possible. But, the problem arrived at here is not that of physical or objective explanation of phenomenal consciousness because that is typical of physicalism, but that of the epistemic question of the properties of qualia. What are the characteristic properties of qualia? That is the question, and, materialism about conscious experience must assign greater authority to neuroscience (physical science) in identifying the qualities of conscious experience than to subjects who undergo the experience. But, there is a general principle which stands in the way of deference to physical science in identifying the qualities of consciousness. The principle may be called the ‘the first-person authority principle’…(Graham George, 1993, p 205)

So this is beyond the ordinary claim of physical explanation, it is a problem of getting to know what it is that is to be reduced.

By implication, physicalism has agreed to the ontology of phenomenal consciousness, since if you do not agree that a phenomenon exists in the first place, you do not make any attempt to reduce it to another phenomenon. The major problem now is that of the epistemic characteristic of that phenomenon. Now, since physicalists only have at their disposal, objective means to explain matters, how now do they want to use objective concepts to explain subjective qualities without leaving anything out? I hereby join the other supporters of qualia to say that such possibility if it exists surpasses the understanding of human being in principle.

**Qualia’s Relationship with Some Mental Illness in Nigeria**

Now, let us apply this theory to some societal experiences in Nigeria. Permit me to pick some of my examples from Yoruba society; I am more familiar with that society than others. Besides, I have to forestall hasty generalization. The question that quickly besets us is; if physicalism is true, why do we still have many mentally deranged and mad men and women on our streets and in our neighborhoods? Are these problems not objective such that the medical doctor or the physician or a neuroscientist or even a psychologist will just objectively diagnose these cases, trace these problems to a certain malfunctioning of some nerves or brain cell or others, correct it and get them healed? But, there are some occasions when these experts diagnosed and certified that nothing, medically or physically, (used in the case of physicalism), is wrong with an individual who is suffering from a certain abnormal or disorderly behavior, such as having some uncommon experiences or hearing and responding to some strange voices. On such occasions, these patients are referred back to the spiritualists or traditional healers.

But you will certainly recall that having experiences, such as seeing strange things, and hearing some strange voices are all part of what I argue to be beyond the explanation of physicalism. This is because, these are phenomenal experiences which comes under qualia that I have been discussing. It may be argued that some of these so called mentally deranged people are healed physically or by medical means. But, if this argument is true, then there should not be any psychologically or mentally deranged people anywhere anywhere. Physicalist explanation should have been able to provide a means that will heal or cure them all.
But, this argument becomes problematic since there are cases in Yorubaland (South-western Nigeria) where cases of some psychologically disturbed or mentally deranged people were referred to traditional spiritualists from some orthodox psychiatric hospitals. It is to such cases that Yoruba would say that *oni owo ninu* (i.e. it is caused by some strange powers). And the relatives of such persons are advised to seek local medicine men (Babalawo, herbalist, Traditional healers or Spiritualists), i.e., *fi ese ile to*. In some cases, most of these cases referred to the spiritualists are cured. However, I only need an instance of a patient cured by a spiritualist to make my case here. The pertinent question now is; how do the spiritualists handle the issue of phenomenal consciousness? The simple answer at this moment is that all they do is that they approached the issues of consciousness from an angle different from the physicalist perspective. What does this apparently suggest to us? It means that there is an aspect of consciousness that physicalism cannot explain. What this implies is that it then becomes insufficient for the physicalism to assume its explanation is necessary for the problem of phenomenal consciousness. For fear of being dogmatic, physicalism explanation should not only be limited to the explanation of physical cases, issues and things alone, but it should attempt, as well, to provide some physical and objective explanation of some mythical or spiritual issues and cases. It is only when physicalism considers and attempts some other perspectives towards consciousness, such as providing physical explanation of some *factual* but none physical matters, that it would be able to treat psychologically or mentally affected people holistically. It is this kind of attempt that *Yoruba Traditional Medicine and the Challenge of Integration* tries to make by exploring mythical aspect of Yoruba traditional medicine through the objective or empirical means. There has also been a call for the development of the spiritual or traditional way of healing people so as to help the physicalists in their explanation of issues. We know that bad dreams could be so devastating and disturbing, for those who dream. But who is that physicalist that would cure this? All that a psychologist or neurophysiologists can do is to give some causal explanations and provide some precautionary measures. But obviously, such precautionary measures, in most cases, only succeed in worsening the problem. It is time physicalism widened its horizon of explanation. Even, thinking of the Llinas hypothesis, opening the brain and altering the brain cells would not solve the problem. This in effect will only change the dimension of the dream, if at all it would do anything. There are some other types of illness such as; hearing of abnormal sound, hearing of abnormal voice commanding a person to do something dangerous or evil, nightmares, day-dreaming, partial or full madness, all of which are traceable to the issue qualitative aspect of consciousness. This is saying that it will make sense to find an all round means of studying this aspect of consciousness on its own right and try to use to solve the persistent cases of psychosis and other related illness which are common in the *Yorubaland* in particular and Nigeria in general.
Conclusion

The need for adequate explanation of the characteristics and properties of consciousness (qualia inclusive) is the fundamental as well as challenging project that must precede any reductionist work, since, “If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view”\(^{16}\) (Nagel, 1979). Then, given that, qualia or phenomena experience remains a distinct phenomenon which cannot be successfully reduced to or explained by neurological or neurobiological processes of the brain. Then, I have substantiated my argument in the persistent case of madness and other related mental illness in Yoruba land in particular and in Nigeria in general and I have, in this respect, argued that the widened perspective towards understanding of the nature of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness may assist the experts to tackle this menace and clear our streets. The question of what it is to see red, I am aware, is itself a good topic for research paper upon which a researcher may wish to work in the future.

References


Footnotes


2 Nagel Thomas: *Mortal Questions* ;( Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1979) p 179. He argued that one might try to develop concepts that could be used. But one would reach a blank wall eventually. For him the loose intermodal analogies- for example, ‘Red is like the sound of a trumpet’- are of little use since this would only be clear to someone who has both seen red and heard a trumpet before.

3 Broad, C.D., *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, (New York: The Humanities Press Inc, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD; 1925) *Internet material*. He (the archangel) would know exactly what the microscopic structure of ammonia must be; but he would be totally unable to predict that a substance with this structure must smell as ammonia does when it gets into human nose. The utmost that he could predict on this subject would be that certain changes would take place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves and so on. But he could not possibly know that these changes would be accompanied by the appearance of a smell in general or of the peculiar smell of ammonia in particular, unless someone told him so or he had smelled it for himself.

4 For more and better information on how difficult it is to define phenomenal consciousness, this is what Ned Block has to say; “Let me acknowledge at the outset that I cannot define P-consciousness in any remotely noncircular way….The best one can do for P-consciousness is…point to the phenomenon” (Block, 1995, p 230).
See Double Richard, 1985. Phenomenal properties, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume XLV, Number 3, p 388. “Let us admit that it is unclear how a physical entity could be phenomenal”.

Patricia Churchland: Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness; ed, Guven G; Current Issues In Philosophy.

Kelly Dean Jolley and Michael Watkins, 1998, What is it like to be a Phenomenologist? pp 204-209, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 48, Number 190, p 205

Ibid p 531.


Nagel T: opt cit, pp 172, 173. “This bears on the mind-body problem. For if the facts of experience- facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism- are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experience could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. The latter is a domain of objective par excellence-the kind that can be observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems”. Then, “it is difficult to understand what could be meant by the objective character of an experience, apart from the particular point of view from which its subject apprehends it”.

McGinn C, opt cit, p 533. “A point whose significant it would be hard to overstate here is this: the property of consciousness itself (or specific conscious states) is not an observable or perceptible property of the brain. You can stare into a living conscious brain, yours or someone else’s, and see there a wide variety of instantiated properties…but you will not thereby see what the object is experiencing, the conscious state itself”.

Graham George, opt cit, p 205.

I have seen cases of mentally derailed people whose cases are referred to the traditionalists from the orthodox medical experts.


16 Nagel Thomas: *opt cit*, p 167.