Black Americans and the South African Anti-Apartheid Campaign in Portland, Oregon

by

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Abstract

This paper argues that in order to understand the anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland, Oregon it must be located within the particular socio-historical context of race and racism in the city and state. Thus, Black people living in Portland had good reason to compare the Apartheid system in South Africa to their own experience. Therefore, the confluence of national and local issues that move the local anti-Apartheid campaign forward is examined; the paper documents the rise and development of critical organizations in the anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland; the paper focus on the closure of the Honorary South Africa Consulate in downtown Portland and the passing of South Africa divestment legislation at the state level which paralleled actions of the national movement. This study is based on an analysis of historical documents, and interviews with four prominent community activists and politicians regarding their participation. In conclusion, it is argued that this research is important because there is little scholarship of the anti-Apartheid movement in the Northwest region of the U.S., and even less on the role Black people in the state of Oregon played in the anti-apartheid movement.

Cliff Walker, a Black American born in Portland, Oregon, expressed his motivation to participate in the South African (SA) Anti-Apartheid movement as “a no brainer”. He based his position for supporting SA Anti-Apartheid efforts on experiences of police harassment and being called a “Nigger” in his youth in Portland. Additionally, he recalled that his mother was socially and politically active and South Africa was part of the conversations he had at home with her. Walker connected his involvement in the SA Anti-Apartheid movement with his experiences of racial discrimination in Portland and the growing awareness of the ways that the United States generally and Oregon specifically, supported the SA Apartheid government.

Walker expressed this connection between Black Portlanders and Black South Africans in an image he created in the late 1970s. An image that asks, how can judges in Portland, Oregon who own stock in a country that benefits from legal racial discrimination and inequality make decisions about Black Americans? He argued that these judges should recuse themselves in cases involving Black defendants because they had financial interests in SA. A few years later Walker argued strongly against the transfer of city and county retirement funds to Oregon’s Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) at a Multnomah County meeting to discuss the transfer. He stated that PERS operates a “racist, apartheid investment fund because it invests in companies doing business with South Africa.”4 In 1982, however, Multnomah County and the City of Portland voted to move their pension fund portfolios to PERS. This is crucial, because the majority of Black people in Oregon had and continues to live in the city of Portland and Multnomah County.5

Like Walker and many Black Americans involved in the SA Anti-Apartheid movement in Portland, their commitment was often rooted in the relationship between the SA Apartheid system and racism in the United States. Walker’s claims of the interconnectedness between the SA Apartheid system and Oregon were not unfounded. In 1981, 49 companies in Oregon were conducting business in South Africa and $23.5 million in exports and $6 million in imports moved between the state and South Africa.6 Additionally, that same year, the Oregon Treasury Department reported that the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System had over $190 million invested in American companies with substantial business operations in South Africa.7 However, if other state investment funds and private financial institutions based in Oregon are included this figure reaches over half a billion dollars.8
This paper argues that in order to understand the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland, Oregon it must be located within the particular socio-historical context of race and racism in the city and state. Thus, in this paper I ask what is the relationship between Portland’s racial history and the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland, Oregon? This deserves exploration and analysis, because in various ways Portland’s racial history is unique compared to other large urban areas in the United States.

In the first section I locate the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland in the racial history of Oregon to demonstrate that Black people living in Portland had good reason to compare the SA Apartheid system with their experience. For example, Oregon attempted to make itself a White homeland early in its history. Furthermore, Black people’s observations along with social economic indicators of education, housing, employment and criminal justice throughout much of the 20th Century indicate Portland was and continues to be one of the worst places for Black people to live in the United States.

The second section examines the confluence of national and local issues that move the local SA Anti-Apartheid campaign forward. I show that Black political activism in Portland reaches its apex in the late 1970s and early 80s, which is also when the national SA Anti-Apartheid movement gains traction. Here, the paper documents the rise and development of two critical organizations in the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland, Oregon: the Black United Front (BUF) and Portlanders Organized for South African Freedom (POSAF).

The third section chronicles the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Oregon. Here attention is paid to two critical efforts: 1) the closure of the Honorary SA Consulate in downtown Portland; 2) and the passing of SA divestment legislation at the state level. Each of these efforts paralleled the strategies of the national movement. In this section I endeavor to show the specific challenges that the campaign confronted both in the city of Portland and at the state level.

This case study is based on analysis of 100s of historical documents, such as newsletters, press releases, newspaper articles and correspondence that elucidate the role Black Americans played in the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Oregon. In addition, interviews were conducted with four prominent community activists and politicians regarding their participation in the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Oregon, which are analyzed to provide further analysis. This research is important because there is little scholarship of the SA Anti-Apartheid movement in the Northwest region of the United States and even less regarding the role of Black people in this movement in the state of Oregon.

Oregon Racial History: From Whites Only to Small, Excluded and Segregated

Many if not most White people who settled in the Oregon territory hoped and planned to create a White homeland. Oregon both during its period as a territory and its initiation into statehood passed exclusion laws that prohibited the settlement of Black people. For example, legal historian Cheryl Brooks wrote the following regarding the passing of the Oregon Exclusion law,

“In November of 1857, Oregon voters approved the proposed constitution, rejected slavery (by a vote of 7727 to 2645), and excluded free blacks and “mulattoes” (by a vote of 8649 to 1081).”

Indeed, Oregon holds the distinction as being the only state in the Union that had a Black exclusion law in its original constitution. While other states such as Illinois and Indiana did pass exclusion laws, Oregon’s stayed on the books until 1926, longer than any other state. Brooks goes on to demonstrate that along with other racial policies, White people conspired to make Oregon a White homeland because they believed Black people to be inferior.

The exclusion laws of Oregon are similar to the SA Apartheid policy of limiting Black South Africans to the Bantustans because they each made Black people non-citizens of their own country. Indeed, scholarship has shown that SA looked to the United States for effective strategies on how to oppress Black South Africans and Oregon’s example is arguably among the most representative of South African racial policy. Like Oregon’s early racial history, South Africa chose complete exclusion and non-citizenship as a more effective strategy than the de jure and de facto segregation policies that most of the rest of the country used to oppress Black people.

Building upon the efforts to exclude Black people from the state, Oregonians in 1868 voted to rescind their initial ratification of the 14th Amendment, which guaranteed citizenship to Black Americans in the United States. The rescission of the 14th Amendment together with Oregon’s official policy of Black exclusion sent an emphatic message to Black people that they were not welcome and is evident in the small numbers that migrated to Oregon compared to other West Coast states. Records indicate that Portland's Black population in 1860 was about130 and from 1900 to 1920 ranged from 775 to 1556. The arrival of the railroad and associated job opportunities in Portland established the city as the center of the Black American population in Oregon. Interestingly, it seems the overall small population of the Black community simply did not pose enough of a threat to the majority White population for the development of official policies of racial discrimination at this time.

There is little evidence that African Americans experienced legal forms of discrimination in the late 19th and earliest parts of the 20th century. In 1906 for example, Black men could vote and serve as jurors, and their children could attend school with White children. However, with the growth of European immigrants in Portland during the early part of 20th century racial discrimination began to become more explicit. Unions excluded African Americans, and restaurants, hotels, and theaters often refused to serve Black people. According to urban studies professor Karen Gibson, "in 1919, the Portland Realty Board adopted a rule declaring it unethical for an agent to sell property to either Negro or Chinese people in a White neighborhood. The Realtors felt it was best to declare a section of the city for them so that the projected decrease in property values could be contained within limited special boundaries."\(^\text{18}\)

This practice started the process of establishing the Albina district in Northeast Portland as the neighborhood where Black people would live.\(^\text{19}\)

Prior to 1940 the Black American population did not exceed 2500 and was the smallest on the West Coast. However, the Black American population grew tenfold, reaching approximately 25,000, in and near the city of Portland in the early 1940’s due to employment opportunities associated with war-time ship building industry. With the growth of the Black American population efforts to control and oppress them became more explicit and residential segregation became the most important issue defining the Black experience in Portland, Oregon.\(^\text{20}\)

Through legal and extra-legal forms of residential segregation realtors, banks and city government collaborated to restrict this population largely to the Albina district in the North East section of the city. As WW2 ended and employment and housing discrimination increased more African Americans left Portland compared to any other West Coast city and by 1950 less than ten thousand African Americans remained.\(^\text{21}\)

On the one hand, the growth of the population of Black people in Portland appears to have enhanced its ability to resist and challenge racial discrimination and inequality.\(^\text{22}\) For example in the 1950’s, Black led but White majority organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban League in collaboration with other civic groups were able to pass state level legislation to address discrimination in housing, employment and public accommodations.\(^\text{23}\)

On the other, the city of Portland gained a “national reputation among blacks of being the worst city on the West Coast, as bad as any place in the South.”\(^\text{24}\) By the late 1960’s, Portland was the second most segregated West Coast city behind Los Angeles\(^\text{25}\) and experienced disproportionate police harassment and brutality, unemployment and poverty.\(^\text{26}\) For example, during the 1960’s and 70’s arrest and incarceration rates of Black people in Portland and Oregon were above the national average.\(^\text{27}\)

After the city of Portland sanctioned Black people’s segregation in inner North East Portland, the combination of urban renewal policies and disinvestment in the form of redlining and mortgage fraud simultaneously destroyed majority Black neighborhoods and commercial centers while pushing the Black community to the northern boundaries of the city.

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Like many Black people living in urban areas across the United States, Black Portlanders struggled with the not unrelated issues of undervalued housing in disrepair and abandonment combined with disinvestment in schools, employment discrimination, police brutality, crack cocaine and gang warfare. These processes resulted in the ghettoization of outer Northeast Portland in the early 1980s and it is within this context that the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland takes shape.

The Black United Front and Portlanders Organized for Southern African Freedom

In the late 1970s Herb Cawthorn and Ronnie Herndon founded a Black United Front (BUF) chapter to challenge persistent racial inequality in Portland Public Schools (PPS) and police harassment and brutality. Through the BUF’s efforts challenging PPS and the Portland Police Bureau it emerged as the leader and voice of the Black community in the late 1970s and early 80s. Herndon, Chairman of the BUF described the level of influence the BUF garnered during the late 1970s and early 80s,

At that point in time we, this community, probably had far more impact upon decisions that were being made than any other point that I had seen before or since. We were very much involved in economic development discussions, police, housing. You name it, we had a seat at the table.

In 1979 the BUF along with the multiracial group called Community Coalition for School Integration orchestrated a Portland Public School boycott to address persistent segregation and educational inequality, which resulted in the retirement and/or removal of four members of the school board. Additionally, in 1981 the BUF played a leading role in the firing of two police officers involved in the Possum Tossum incident.

In 1973, Herndon helped to found the African Liberation Day (ALD) event in Portland. ALD was initiated at the Conference of Independent African States in Accra, Ghana in 1958, which “called on Africans and people of African descent around the world to set aside the day for rededication to the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles in Africa.” The event spread to the United States and was held annually in major cities across the nation, including Portland for the next 15 years.

ALD intentionally made connections between the lives of Black South Africans and Black Portlanders as it addressed the similar challenges Black Americans and Black South Africans faced in terms of employment, education, health care and police brutality.
Black Portlander’s motivation to challenge the United States support of Apartheid in South Africa was more than just sympathy for other Black people, but an example of their recognition of and response to “common sources, forms and consequences of the particular oppression involved.”

Avel Gordly, who was a member of the BUF and leading community organizer within the Black community at the time, wrote the following regarding the organizational cohesiveness and power of the BUF in the early 1980s in Portland, Oregon:

The BUF had tentacles into all the different organizations and places in the community. If the organization issued a call that people needed to show up at a school board meeting or in front of the police station or wherever needed, the call would go through all those organizations that participated in the Front and the call would go out to churches.

Gordly demonstrates that the BUF had developed a reputation for being the organization that could be counted on for supporting and struggling for those issues that were important to Black people in Portland.

It is within this context that the BUF and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) partnered to form Portlanders Organized for South African Freedom (POSAF) in 1983. POSAF’s mission read,

POSAF was begun in September of 1983 as a community organization dedicated to supporting all peoples in Southern Africa who are struggling to end the system of Apartheid. The primary focus of POSAF is to expose and challenge U.S. cultural and economic ties with South Africa.

Elizabeth Groff, the director of the AFSC Southern Africa division in Portland actively sought out Black American leadership for her division. Groff explained that her connection and desire to participate in the SA Anti-Apartheid movement was based partly on her having lived in West Africa where she observed the positive impacts and potential of decolonization. She also stated that other AFSC chapters across the country recognized the need to include African Americans in their efforts and that she “was self-conscious about being a White person in the Southern Africa division.” She commented that the coming together of the BUF and the AFSC did not occur without some tensions and contradictions. Groff recruited and hired Avel Gordly to lead the South African division in the AFSC because of her strong connections to the Black community and the BUF.
The collaboration between these two groups, although at times challenging, combined the leadership and energy of the African American community and the political and economic resources of the AFSC toward their mutual goal of challenging Oregon’s support of SA Apartheid. For example, Herndon observed that the support of the AFSC was, “instrumental in providing administrative work for that group. Office space, phone calls, among other stuff. Getting copies made. Help coordinate the day to day stuff.” Groff explained that “the BUF was very outspoken. That energy was brought, that kind of energy, commitment, determination, audacity was brought to the Southern African movement.” While Groff dedicated herself towards SA Anti-Apartheid efforts, she claims that the BUF brought a particular level of commitment that motivated them and provided the energy behind the campaign to push it forward.

The SA Anti-Apartheid movement in the United States would not have been successful without it being a multi-racial movement, but it is important to point out Black and White people often participated in and supported the SA Anti-Apartheid movement in the United States for different reasons. Black Americans motivation to resist Apartheid more often than not hinged on their recognition of the similarity between their racialized condition and that of Black South Africans. The liberal ethic against explicit forms of racial discrimination and inequality structured much of the position of White people in America that resisted SA Apartheid. The overlap of these two positions provided the momentum for a powerful SA Anti-Apartheid movement in the United States and Oregon.

The work of POSAF began in April of 1984 with the announcement of South Africa Week in Portland. POSAF organized South Africa Week at the beginning of April because it overlapped with the date of the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and the anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre. The Sharpeville Massacre occurred in South Africa in late March of 1960 where the South African Police opened fire on a non-violent protest killing 72 unarmed men, women and children and injuring 200. POSAF, by combining these two moments of racial history, re-emphasized the ways Black people in both countries had a common struggle and were in fact connected.

South Africa Week also included a variety of activities to bring attention to and educate Portlanders about the oppression of Black South Africans, their resistance to Apartheid, and Oregon and the United States’ role in supporting SA Apartheid. One day of the event focused on the sale of Kruggerands (South African gold coins) and the Honorary South African Consulate in the city of Portland. These two issues were the primary targets of POSAF organizing efforts in the build up to SA Anti-Apartheid legislation. The week also consisted of speaking events and workshops, many of which were held at institutions of the Black American community in Northeast Portland.
South Africa Week concluded with “The International March Against Racist Violence”, which was the fourth such march organized by the BUF. Black Americans in Portland could relate to the theme of racial violence because in the mid-1970s the police had shot and killed four Black men; in the early 80s the police were involved in the Possum Tossum incident that was referred to earlier; and again in the early 80s a cross was burned on the property of a local Black activist in the King neighborhood in Northeast Portland. During the march approximately 300 protesters chanted, “Won’t take no more; can’t stand no more.” And carried signs stating “No more killings”, Fight Racism” and “Women, people of color and gays—Same fight.”

As Avel Gordly stated, the BUF was a powerful organization not only in the Black community, but also in Portland politics in general. That the issues of women and gays were included in South Africa Week speaks to the growing influence and importance of the BUF in local politics. However, this collaboration also demonstrates the Black community’s dependency on, because of its small size, other largely White progressive groups in the city in order to increase their level of influence. The BUF’s collaboration with the AFSC reflects this strategy.
The Honorary South African Consulate and Divestment Legislation

It is at this moment that the Black community is fully engaged with the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland. The Black American community had developed a growing consciousness of and solidarity with Black South Africans. There existed a powerful leadership cadre evident largely in the BUF. In addition, Margaret Carter became the first Black women elected to the Oregon legislature in 1984. Carter was sent a clear mandate from the community she represented, Northeast Portland where the majority of Black people lived in the city, that she was to carry forward SA Anti-Apartheid legislation. The confluence of a growing awareness of SA, powerful leadership and a Black elected official at the state level combined with the history of resistance and cohesion of the Black American community at this time provided the energy and foundation for a robust SA Anti-Apartheid campaign.

In September of 1984 White South Africans voted for a new constitution that provided some measures of citizenship for the “colored population” of South Africa but not the majority Black population. Black South Africans across the country rejected the new constitution and responded with increased levels of resistance. Hundreds of people were killed, more were arrested as strikes were called and people openly criticized Apartheid in South Africa, which was illegal. In addition, Reagan was reelected in November of 1984 and his administration abstained from the unanimous United Nations General Consul condemnation of South Africa’s recent policies. Reagan’s policy of “constructive engagement” angered SA Anti-Apartheid activists because investments and trade with South Africa increased dramatically under this policy.51

In response to the United States’ complicity in support of the SA Apartheid government and the growing oppression of Black South Africans, four Black American leaders protested at the South African Consulate in Washington D.C. They were the founder and president of TransAfrica Randall Robinson, Congressperson Walter Frauntroy, U.S. Civil Rights Commission member Mary Francis Barry, and former president Carter administration official and law professor Eleanor Holmes Norton.52 When the protests in Washington D.C. began POSAF took the lead in efforts to close Oregon’s only African consulate, the Honorary SA Consulate. Protests at the consulate in Portland provided the opportunity to educate Oregonians about the ways the state played a role in supporting SA Apartheid.

The first demonstration attracted approximately 300 protesters and 50 to 100 protesters at subsequent events. The protests took place every Wednesday and Friday at noon and diverse groups of people and organizations representing labor, education, churches and various political organizations were present. POSAF organized prominent representatives of these organizations to be arrested on trespassing charges. The mainstream press did not cover the protests as well as POSAF would have liked, but the Black press and other alternative media outlets provided extensive coverage.
Margaret Carter protested at the consulate and was detained by police. She made the following comment regarding her treatment by the Portland Police Bureau:

It was really kind of interesting because the police department at the time did not want to make a big deal of the fact that a sitting legislator had been jailed because they felt that would be giving more credence to it. And so what they did was take me into a building and they stopped mid floor. And it was dark and creepy and one of the cops was sitting with me on this dirt floor it was scary as all out doors… They asked if they were to let me go would I not march and I said no. So they kept me long enough until the marchers left and when the marchers left they took me out. I was underground for nearly two hours. I would do it again.

She also stated there were three issues that her community expected her to carry forward as a representative of her district. They were legislation for a Martin Luther King holiday, minority contracting and South African divestment legislation. Carter’s reference to the primary concerns she was expected to carry to the legislation show that the Black community remained focused on racial discrimination and inequality in SA and within Oregon. In 1985 the state legislature did make the largely symbolic issue of Martin Luther King’s birthday a holiday in the state. However, as Carter also stated, to date there has been no legislation passed addressing the more substantive issues of minority contracting.
Ronnie Herndon and Reverend John Jackson of Mount Olivet Baptist Church were the first people arrested at the consulate protests. Margaret Carter had by this time requested that her chief of staff start drafting a SA Anti-Apartheid legislation bill. Avel Gordly was one of the lead organizers of the protests at the consulate. She represented both the BUF and the AFSC. Her prior work of advocating for and struggling against racially discriminatory criminal justice policies located her as an important representative of the Black community.

As the protests continued more arrests were made and media coverage increased. On January 18th, 1985, approximately six weeks after protests began, Calvin Van Pelt resigned and closed Portland, Oregon’s only consulate representing an African country. The following is an excerpt from his official letter of resignation:

It is now clear that the demonstrations will not cease, and that I cannot continue to serve without inflicting further hardships on those who live and work around me. This I cannot conscientiously do. I am certain that some elements will regard my resignation as a victory, but it is a triumph of harassment, not of ideas.

In his resignation letter he also argued that the closure of the consulate was meaningless because it did little to change the conditions of Black South Africans, while he remained silent about SA sanctioned racial discrimination and inequality and the consulate’s support of SA Apartheid. Additionally, for SA Anti-Apartheid activists, the media attention created through the protests and closure of the consulate showed to people living in Oregon the ways its state was complicit in supporting SA Apartheid. Avel Gordly, described the effort to close the consulate:

We just wore Van Pelt down. He and the chief of police realized that this was a movement of people who weren’t going away. And we could not be dismissed as a ragtag group of barefooted hippies who didn’t have jobs and who were going to smoke a bunch of pot. We had people in suits with briefcases. And we made it very clear each time we marched that “we’ll see you next time.”

Gordly explained that POSAF was very intentional about who was arrested and communicating with the media. She speaks to an awareness of the possibility of the media discounting their efforts based on the class and cultural backgrounds of the protesters. By controlling to the best of their ability who got arrested and who was present at the protests, POSAF kept the focus on closing the consulate.

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One of the primary objectives of the protests was to gain media coverage in order to heighten awareness of the conditions of Black South Africans and Oregon’s investment in companies doing business in South Africa. Alternative media sources, such as Portland’s African American newspapers were consistent in their support of the protesters at the consulate before and after the resignation of Van Pelt. However, the Oregonian was limited in its coverage of the protests. While coverage did increase substantially both in regards to content and quantity after the closure of the consulate, the Oregonian sided with the Honorary SA Consulate. For example, an editorial titled “No winners in ‘victory’ ” sought to marginalize the protests and, incredibly compared them to the tactics of Nazi Germany and people who bombed abortion clinics. It stated,

This is the kind of action sanctioned in Nazi Germany, where thugs marched through the streets, beating those who chose to be different or sought to stand up to them. That was the modern nation built upon the standard of the end justifies the means.

While there were few explicit instances during the campaign of pro-Apartheid efforts, this example does come close. Arguably the editorial board, here, attempted to undermine the closure of the consulate and efforts that followed by mischaracterizing the protestors. Furthermore, the Oregonian did not report that POSAF had organized a party after Van Pelt’s resignation to help support the businesses that were disrupted because of the protests, while the Black newspapers did.

The closure of the Honorary SA consulate represented a key moment in the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland and Oregon. Press coverage had increased and the national SA Anti-Apartheid movement acknowledged the efforts and successes of the Oregon campaign. Gordly writes in her memoir that Randall Robinson, who was the director of TransAfrica, sent a letter congratulating POSAF for their success in closing the consulate. Clearly, this was an important and substantive victory. However, the conditions at home for many Black Americans participating in the campaign must have made such victories bittersweet. Gordly’s comments regarding the contrast between the activism of Black South Africans and the gang warfare occurring in her community is telling:

I thought especially about young men who were engaged in gang wars, who did not have a clue about identity and who instead played out their confusion around turf and drugs. The young men of similar age in the refugee camps of southern Africa were fighting for something that we took for granted: freedom. It was too much. It was overwhelming.
Gordly’s comparison between Black South African resistance and the apparent self-destruction within the Black community speaks to the frustration of the inability after years of struggle to enact substantive change concerning issues of racial inequality and discrimination in Portland. Her observations demonstrate that she continued to be concerned about conditions within her community, however, her comments also suggest that it was refreshing to be a part of a movement that was clear in its objectives and supported nationally and internationally much like the Civil Rights movement. This does not mean Gordly and others in the Black community no longer perceived racism at home and abroad as disconnected, only that they understood that they had a winnable fight in the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign. As the following section will show the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Oregon had the support of the international and national movement along with many local predominantly White organizations. While many White Oregonians could support SA Anti-Apartheid efforts, persistent racial discrimination and inequality in the state continued to be ignored. With the closure of the consulate behind them, POSAF began to direct its attention towards divestment legislation.

The First Efforts to Pass Divestiture Legislation: House Bill 2001

The evidence suggests that it was not until the Black American community in Portland, Oregon became involved that SA Anti-Apartheid efforts were able to achieve change at the state level. In the first quarter of 1985 POSAF kept the divestment issue alive by organizing another South Africa Week in late March. The organizing in Portland coincided and was coordinated with the growing national movement to influence federal legislation.

In April of 1985 the City of Portland endorsed the passage of HB 2001 and in late June of 1985 both houses of the Oregon State legislature passed House Bill 2001 with support from republicans and democrats. While, HB2001 strongly condemned and opposed Apartheid in South Africa, it was a moderate divestment bill because it only required the state to divest from a minority of stocks. At no other moment in the history of the United States, and in Oregon had there been such a high level of support for sanctions and divestment. Significantly, the Oregonian published two opinion articles supporting SA Anti-Apartheid legislation. One suggested optimistically that then republican Governor Vik Atiyeh would support the bill, because it was his last term and his decision would more accurately reflect his personal opinion. Nevertheless, Governor Atiyeh vetoed the bill.

There are a number of reasons that help explain why the governor vetoed the bill considering the high level of public support at this time for divestment legislation. Nike, which was founded in Oregon and its headquarters, is located in the Portland Metro Area, had significant investments in South Africa in the 1980s. Margaret Carter recalled the response she received upon submitting the divestment legislation in 1985:
I received death threats. I received all kinds of negative letters about the legislation. Legislators were upset with me from one end of the state to the other that I would put them in a position where they would have to vote on something like this... And so in 1985 we couldn’t get that legislation through because we didn’t have a chance for Nike to do its divestments from South Africa.68

Carter and Cliff Walker each suggested that Nike had large investments in South Africa and pressured the Governor’s office to wait until they could withdraw their investments before legislation was passed. Besides this pressure Atiyeh believed government had no business determining how public employee retirement accounts were invested.69 Additionally, Atiyeh, who was close to President Reagan had to be aware that he would also have divestment legislation on his desk in a number of months and would be compelled to sign. Knowing that a federal resolution was imminent, Atiyeh may have abdicated his responsibility to the federal government as he believed that sanctions against other governments should be handled at the national level.70

For many Black people in Portland, the veto of the SA Anti-Apartheid legislation was a bitter pill to swallow. Racial tensions again rose in the city of Portland on April 20th of 1985 because Portland police officers killed Lloyd Stevenson. Stevenson was a Black American off-duty security guard who was helping to calm down an altercation between the owner of a convenience store and suspected thief near his home.

But when the police arrived they went for Stevenson, the only Black person in the crowd, wrestled him to the ground and officer Gary Barbour killed Stevenson using a “sleeper hold.” After the killing two Portland Police Bureau (PPB) officers printed shirts stating “Don’t Choke ‘Em, Smoke ‘Em, in response to the Portland Police Bureau’s banning of the choke hold associated with Stevenson’s killing. Newspaper coverage was widespread across the state. For Black people in Portland this incident demonstrated how Oregon and South Africa were similar; racist violence against Black people was a fact of life. Ben Priestly, a BUF member, summed upped the Black community’s feelings regarding the governor’s veto when he wrote “his veto of House Bill 2001, which called for divestment of state funds associated with South Africa, show a disrespect for the Oregon Commission on Black Affairs and the black population statewide.”71

Ironically, Stevenson’s killing very likely helped to rejuvenate the SA Anti-Apartheid movement in Oregon.
Passage of House Bill 2001

In early October of 1985, the City of Portland, through mayor Bud Clark’s office, issued a proclamation declaring October 11 and 12th Days of Protest Against Apartheid and urged all citizens of Portland to call for an end to all SA Apartheid policies and practices, an end to investment in South Africa, and to strongly encourage the freeing of Nelson Mandela and all South African political prisoners. The event included a march and rally held at Terry Shrunk Plaza on October 12th, which featured a speaker from the African National Congress and local representatives from the clergy, labor and public office. The event was sponsored by POSAF and endorsed by over 50 community organizations, churches, unions and public officials. Possibly, this was an easy way for elected officials to alleviate some of the racial tension in the city and cast themselves as against racial injustice.

How do we understand the high levels of support for the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland and at the state level at this time? Clearly the organizing efforts of POSAF had heightened the awareness of this issue by showing Oregonians the role they played in supporting the SA Apartheid government. Additionally, at the national and international level there had never been greater support for ending SA Apartheid and disinvestment had become the primary way to challenge this system. However, it must be recognized also that the city of Portland was in the middle of its own struggles with racial inequality and discrimination. The city of Portland had effectively dismantled the physical Black community in Northeast Portland through a combination of housing and development policies. Portland Public Schools continued to struggle with issues of segregation and low academic achievement. And Black community police relations continued to be in conflict evident in the killing of unarmed security guard Lloyd Stevenson. Through SA African divestment legislation Oregon could to some degree demonstrate that it did not support racial discrimination and inequality, at least in faraway places that explicitly practiced them. In Oregon, Black people and other supportive groups had little recourse but to accept this and try to win the very important SA divestment legislation.

In April 1986, POSAF organized in conjunction with the National Divestment Protest Day demonstrations in front of the computer company IBM. IBM was being targeted for their support of SA Apartheid through the selling of computers systems to the SA government. At the demonstrations dozens of people were arrested. In the following month on May 24th POSAF organized African Liberation Day. The event included a march and rally held at Irving Park in Northeast Portland. Margaret Carter was one of the speakers. Carter stated that the primary organization responsible for educating her about South Africa and ultimately pushing her office to submit divestment legislation was the BUF:
They (the BUF) were the people that were engaging me. Educating me. I didn’t know anything about South African divestiture. At the time I was an educator with Portland Community College. Mother of nine children. Working two jobs and that kind of stuff. I was educated unequivocally by the BUF on these issues. There is no doubt about that. They must be in the forefront for being able to take credit for South African divestiture. 

She went on to comment that it was the grassroots pressure of the BUF that kept the issue alive within the media, while not discounting the need for support within the legislature and the support of other organizations and individuals.

October of 1986 represented the most active month in the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Portland for POSAF. On October 11th it organized National Anti-Apartheid Protest Day that included a march and rally in downtown Portland and featured speakers from the ANC and local clergy, labor and politicians. On the 25th in downtown Portland POSAF organized an event that focused on demonstrating the similarities between the motivations of the United States’ policies in Latin America and South Africa. Finally on the 30th of October, POSAF held a “Freedom Now” rally at Mount Olivet Baptist Church in Northeast Portland at which both Margaret Carter and prominent ANC representative Susan Mnumzana spoke.

In November of 1986 Neil Goldschmidt was elected governor of Oregon. He was a democrat and early in his candidacy indicated he would sign divestment legislation. In addition, the U.S. Congress had just passed the National Anti-Apartheid Act in October of 1986 over president Reagan’s Veto. While a symbolic victory, the National Anti-Apartheid Act was not a divestment bill. That this was a compromised victory is evident in the tone of the response to the Act by Transafrica Director Randall Robinson. “Our jubilance is tempered by the fact that we understand this to be the beginning not the end.”

Margaret Carter explained that she continued to meet with resistance as HB2001 again began to move its way through the legislative session in January of 1987. Carter recalled state assembly member Liz Van Leeuweun’s comments regarding HB 2001 on the assembly floor: “Representative Carter how dare you have this kind of legislation. There are people in South Africa who like eating in the back while their masters eat in the front.” Nevertheless, on May 21st, 1987 an Oregonian headline ran “Oregon divestiture bill OK’d” and the state became the 11th out of 28 states to pass comprehensive South African divestment legislation. Unlike in 1985, the 1987 vote for HB2001 was passed overwhelmingly within both bodies of the Oregon legislature. In addition, the 1987 bill was stronger than the 1985 version and was grounded in the Oregon state constitution, which made legal challenges to its divestment requirements more difficult.
Oregon can count itself among those states that contributed to ending Apartheid in South Africa through enacting divestment legislation. The evidence demonstrates that economic sanctions played a critical role in this process. However, the state of Oregon sacrificed little in enacting divestment legislation. Great care was taken in making sure that the shifts in investment required by HB2001 would not lessen the value of the stock portfolios of Oregon public sector employees. Additionally, there is good evidence to suggest that then Governor Atiyeh may have vetoed divestment legislation to give Nike time to divest in order not to suffer negative publicity. The lack of sacrifice evident in the enactment of divestment legislation is mirrored by the state of Oregon’s unwillingness to invest in post-Apartheid South Africa.

Avel Gordly commented on her trip to South Africa and Zambia in 1999. She describes how she as a state senator, Governor Kitzhaber and others were treated as honored guests in both countries because of the role Oregon played in the SA Anti-Apartheid movement. She explained that these countries opened their doors to Oregon for the opportunity for economic and cultural exchange. She writes with disappointment how Oregon squandered this opportunity,

To this day (to my knowledge) no one from the Economic and Community Development Department ever got on a plane to go back to South Africa or Zambia, where we had sat with the heads of government and state officials, to further develop the relationships we had cultivated.

In conclusion, Black Americans were at the forefront of the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign in Oregon and their reasons for participating are rooted in their identification with Black South African’s similar experience of racial oppression. Today Black Portlanders continue to struggle on many of the same fronts that they were during the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign; key among them being gentrification, police harassment and brutality, disparities in educational achievement and high levels of unemployment.

The recent Communities of Color report claiming that the Portland Metro Area “has a particularly toxic form of racism and institutionalized racism that renders experiences of communities of color worse than their national comparisons” sounds strikingly familiar to the claims in the mid-20th Century of Portland being one of the worst place for Black people to live outside of the South in the mid-20th Century. Furthermore, the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign confronted consistent resistance in the efforts to close the consulate and pass divestment legislation.
Nevertheless, the ending of Apartheid in SA and Oregon’s role in contributing to that accomplishment are significant. The historical record demonstrates that the commitment and dedication by multiple groups in Oregon, largely led by Black Portlanders, contributed to ending Oregon’s relationship with a government that practiced legal racial discrimination and inequality. This and other research shows that Black people have contributed substantively to the political, economic and cultural development of Oregon.

Black people in Portland participated in the SA Anti-Apartheid movement for the same reasons that Black Americans across the country did; they identified through their experiences of racial discrimination and inequality with Black South Africans. As in the rest of the country certain conditions occurred for the movement to develop in Portland, Oregon: Black people won election to political office, a cohort of African American leadership developed, along with a growing sense of Black consciousness. In addition, the SA Anti-Apartheid campaign confronted resistance that was often perpetuated through the mainstream media. This paper addresses the lack of research regarding SA Anti-Apartheid efforts in the Northwest, much less that focusing on the role of Black Americans in this process.

Notes

1 Cliff Walker was Chair of Oregon Commission on Black Affairs when he was interviewed for this project (2/12/10), which is mandated to create awareness of the Black condition in Oregon.


3 Cliff Walker interview with author, December 12, 2010.


13 When the state did re-ratify the Amendment in 1973 it received little media attention or public discussion. For a fuller discussion of the rescission of the 14th amendment in Oregon read, "The Politics of Forgetting: How Oregon Forgot to Ratify the 14th Amendment," by Cheryl A. Brooks Oregon Humanities (Fall/Winter 2006).

14 Walidah Imarisha’s work that asks Why Aren’t There More Black People in Oregon? provides a more in depth analysis of the policies and practices that inhibited Black migration to Oregon, however, the exclusion laws and rescission of the 14th Amendment epitomize the unwelcoming attitude of Oregon towards Black people.


17 Quintard Taylor, The Forging of a Black Community: Seattle's Central District from 1870 through the Civil Rights Era (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994).


29 Ronnie Herndon is an important figure of Black political struggle in Portland. Herndon came to Portland in the 1960’s to attend Reed College where he helped to found the Black Student Union. Later in the early 1970s Herndon helped to create the Black Education Center, which was a private school for Black youth in Portland. His work as one of the directors of the BUF stands out as critical for the improvement of the lives of Black people living in Portland. In his transition to a leadership role within the anti-Apartheid campaign it is evident he saw SA Apartheid inextricably linked to racism in Portland.

30 The BUF is a national organization that was founded in the late 1970s and a chapter of the organization was opened in Portland shortly after.
31 Johnson and Williams.

32 Johnson and Williams: 26.

33 Robert Blanchard angered the African American community because his policies required the continued practice of bussing Black students disproportionately compared to White students to desegregate PPSs. The business community in Portland attempted to reinstate Blanchard, however, he died of a heart attack before this could happen. The Possum Tossum incident involved a number of Portland Bureau of Police officers leaving dead possums at the entrance of an African American owned restaurant. Although two of the officers were initially fired they were able to gain their positions back later.

34 Herndon Interview.


36 In 1972, two prominent African American national conferences were held regarding the United States’ role supporting the South African regime, which caused a surge in Black political mobilization in the national anti-Apartheid movement. Nesbitt: 78.

37 Herndon interview.

38 Johnson, Williard: 3.


41 Groff Interview.

43 Interview with Elizabeth Groff.


46 Nesbitt: 36.


48 Interview with Ronnie Herndon.

49 Interview with Elizabeth Groff.

50 “300 Protest Racist Violence.” *Oregonian*, 4/8/84; p.45.


52 Nesbitt: 123.

53 Margaret carter Interview January 7th, 2011.

54 Margaret carter Interview January 7th, 2011.


56 “Poor news coverage.” *The Oregonian*, 12/27/84.

Prior to the SA divestment campaign that emanates largely out of the Black community in Portland, there were at least two other key challenges to Oregon’s support of the SA Apartheid government. The first was in 1977 when the Oregon Board of Higher Education voted to divest its endowment fund from companies doing business with South Africa. This decision, however, was overturned by the then Oregon Attorney General James Redden the following year. “Board to sell apartheid linked holdings.” *Oregonian*, November 19, 1977: 1. The second was in response to OSU wrestling coach Dale Thomas, who had developed an exchange program between OSU and South African wrestlers to compete and train. The African Student Association attempted to “enforce the international sports boycott of South African athletes at OSU from 1980 through 1982.” Ferguson, Ed. “Introduction” in *Enforcing the International Sports Boycott of South Africa at Oregon State University; News Clippings from the Struggle, 1980-1982*.

*Email communication from Jon Christenson on 9/20/12.*

*Email communication from Jon Christenson on 9/20/12.*


*Carter interview.*

70 Email communication from Jon Christenson on 9/20/12.


76 Carter interview.


The Senate bill prohibited new investments in South Africa, banned imports of steel and other products, denied landing rights to South African Airways, and imposed restrictions on government and commercial ties (Nesbitt: 142)."

Nesbitt: 143.

Carter interview.

Carter interview.

Email communication from Jon Christenson on 9/20/12.


Gordly, Avel: 163.